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ON NOT RENDERING TO CAESAR: THE
UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF TAX REGULATION OF
ACTIVITIES OF RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS
RELATING TO POLITICS*
Edward McGlynn Gaffney, Jr.**
INTRODUCTION: THE HISTORICAL ROLE OF RELIGION IN AMERICAN
POLITICS AND THEOLOGICAL REASONS FOR THIS ExPERIENCE
Each of the affiliates of the National Jewish Community Relations Advisory
Council regards its program as an expression of the tenets of the Jewish
faith which it is organized to advance. Their activities are inspired by the
Prophets' mandate to pursue justice. They believe that mandate governs
[their lives] in all its aspects and requires those who adhere to the principles
of Judaism to let their views be heard in support of justice for all.'
[TIhere are important moral and religious dimensions to each of the
problems facing the human community, and these dimensions must be taken
into consideration in the development of public policy....
The major issues of the day are not purely technical or tactical in nature;
they are fundamental questions in which the moral dimension is a pervasive
and persistent factor ...
* © 1990 Edward McGlynn Gaffney, Jr. All rights reserved. This article will appear as a
chapter in the author's forthcoming volume, SHOULD THE CHURCHES BE TAXED? (Oxford
University Press, 1991).
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Group, Center for Church-State Studies, DePaul University College of Law. Formerly Associate
Professor of Law, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles, and Notre Dame Law School. B.A. 1963, St.
Patrick's College, Menlo Park, CA; S.T.L. 1967, Gregorian University, Rome; J.D., M.A. (Legal
Hist.) 1975, Catholic University of America; LL.M. 1976, Harvard Law School. The author ex-
presses his gratitude to his friends, Joseph Blenkinsopp, Robert McAfee Brown, John A. Coleman,
Cole Durham, Kent Greenawalt, Deirdre Dessingue Halloran, Dean Kelley, Douglas Laycock,
William Marshall, Martin Marty, Michael McConnell, Richard John Neuhaus, Samuel Rabi-
nove, James Skillen, Marc Stern, Oliver Thomas, Michael Woodruff, and John Howard Yoder for
their valuable criticism of an earlier draft of this Article, and to many friends at Stanford Law
School, including Paul Brest, Gerald Gunther, William Cohen, and John Hart Ely, for their gra-
cious hospitality and warm collegiality during a sabbatical year. I would also like to express grati-
tude to the Earhart Foundation, the Stewardship Foundation, and the Institute on Religion and
Public Life for generous financial support of my work during this sabbatical year.
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The participation of the Catholic bishops in public policy discussion is
rooted in our conviction that moral values and principles relate to public
policy as well as to personal choices. It is also rooted in a belief that we
honor our constitutional tradition of religious freedom precisely by exercis-
ing our right to participate in the public life of the nation. Entering the
policy debate as Catholic bishops we make use of a long detailed tradition of
moral analysis and relationships with the universal Church which provide us
with valuable perspectives about the influence of U.S. policy throughout the
world.'
Since the time of Calvin, Reformed Protestants have felt called to share
their vision of God's intended order for the human community, and
Presbyterians have recognized and acted on the responsibility to seek social
justice and peace and to promote the biblical values of freedom and liberty
as well as corporate responsibility within the political order. . . . In "at-
tempting to influence legislation" churches speak to the moral aspects of
political issues. Such witness flows directly from fundamental faith and is
integral to its free exercise. It is essential to the church's identity and mis-
sion, and to the moral authority of its pronouncements, that it speak as
"church" through its religious structures and leaders.3
Within Judaism, Catholicism, and Protestantism, the line between religious
and political concerns is often a fine one, and these concerns often overlap.
Even though it is obvious to religious believers that the teaching of their com-
munities, even about matters of public concern, is bound to be theological, the
point bears emphasis at the beginning of this Article.
Outsiders unfamiliar with these religious traditions can easily mistake reli-
gious conviction for mere partisan advocacy, which may be subject to govern-
mental regulation.' Where theological discourse relates directly to questions
that arise formally as legal controversies, the discourse is bound to be legal as
well. The very fact that the discourse of churches5 is often addressed to elected
officials, let alone that its overt purpose may be to protest against the legiti-
macy of a public policy or to seek a change in public policy, means that the
communication is also to some extent political.
Without much regard for the fragility of the lines demarcating theological,
2. Bernardin, Marty & Adams, The Role of the Religious Leader in the Development of Pub-
lic Policy, 34 DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 3, 4, 6 (1984) (section of article written by Cardinal Bernardin).
3. GOD ALONE is LORD OF THE CONSCIENCE: A POLICY STATEMENT ADOPTED BY THE 200TH
GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH (U.S.A) (1988) 10, 36 (1989), reprinted in 8
J.L. & RELIG. - (1990) [hereinafter GOD ALONE is LORD OF THE CONSCIENCE].
4. Although speaking out on the moral implications of political issues is a religious function
protected by the free exercise clause, it is also political speech, protected by the free speech and
free press clauses. In this Article, the activities of religious organizations relating to politics are
analyzed primarily as a 'dimension of their free exercise rights. For the view that religious rights
ought to be seen only as a specific manifestation of free speech rights, see, for example, Marshall,
Solving the Free Exercise Dilemma: Free Exercise as Expression, 67 MINN. L. REV. 545 (1983).
5. The term "church" in this Article is not restricted to a particular religious body, but includes
all such bodies.
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legal, and political discourse, the Internal Revenue Code and many state stat-
utes modelled on the federal tax code impose significant restraints on two prin-
cipal activities of religious communities.6 Since 1934, as a condition of their
tax-exempt status, religious communities have been forbidden to expend sub-
stantial amounts of their resources in efforts to communicate to elected offi-
cials their moral convictions on matters of public concern (lobbying activities).
After 1954, an absolute ban has been imposed on the efforts of religious orga-
nizations to persuade voters of the correctness of moral convictions that relate
to candidates for public office, and a conditional7 ban has been imposed on
efforts to persuade voters of the correctness of moral considerations that relate
to referenda and other ballot measures (electioneering activities).
This Article will explore the legislative history and the complicated adminis-
trative regulations issued by the IRS concerning the political: speech of reli-
gious communities. Although no decision of the Supreme Court has squarely
decided the constitutionality of the statutory and administrative regulation of
the political activity of churches, this Article discusses the leading cases relat-
ing to this theme, culminating in Regan v. Taxation With Representation.8 I
conclude that the restraints imposed by federal tax regulations on activities of
religious organizations violate the free exercise and free speech rights of these
exempt organizations. Whether or not the Supreme Court in today's climate
would adopt this position, I urge the Congress to reconsider the wisdom of
these restraints in light of the constitutional history set forth here.
The Article also discusses the question whether the power to revoke the ex-
empt status of a religious organization for illegal political activity is confided
to the executive branch, or whether private parties opposed to the message of a
religious group may use the federal courts to enforce the restraints placed by
the tax code on the political activities of religious organizations. This issue was
presented to the Court in the Abortion Rights Mobilization case.'
Before exploring these legal matters, this Article sketches: (1) a general
view of the complex, organic interrelationships among law, history, politics,
and religion; (2) the more particular historical experience of the role of reli-
gion in the shaping of American law and public policy; and (3) theological
convictions underlying the participation of religious communities in American
politics.
6. E.g., I.R.C. § 501(c)(3); CAL. REV. & TAX CODE § 23701d (Deering 1990).
7. The condition is fulfilled if the government determines that a religious body is engaged in
"substantial" efforts to persuade voters about the moral dimensions of ballot measures.
8. 461 U.S. 540 (1983).
9. Abortion Rights Mobilization, Inc. v. Regan, 544 F. Supp. 471 (S.D.N.Y.), certification
denied, 552 F. Supp. 364 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); Abortion Rights Mobilization, Inc. v. Regan, 603 F.
Supp. 970 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Abortion Rights Mobilization, Inc. v. Baker, 110 F.R.D. 337
(S.D.N.Y. 1986), affid sub noma. In re United States Catholic Conference, 824 F.2d 156 (2d Cir.
1987), rev'd sub nom. United States Catholic Conference v. Abortion Rights Mobilization, Inc.,
487 U.S. 72 (1988) (remanding for determination of plaintiffs' standing), on remand, 885 F.2d
1020 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1946 (1990).
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I. LAW, HISTORY, POLITICS, AND RELIGION
In his seminal lectures on the interaction of law and religion, Professor Har-
old Berman offered a dynamic understanding of both law and religion:
Law is not only a body of rules; it is people legislating, adjudicating, ad-
ministering, negotiating-it is a living process of allocating rights and duties
and thereby resolving conflicts and creating channels of cooperation. Reli-
gion is not only a set of doctrines and exercises; it is people manifesting a
collective concern for the ultimate meaning and purpose of life-it is a
shared intuition of and commitment to transcendent values.10
Echoing Berman, Pastor Richard John Neuhaus has written that the purpose
of the law is:
to prevent harm, resolve conflicts, and create means of cooperation. Its pre-
mise, from which it derives its perceived legitimacy and therefore its author-
ity, is that it strives to anticipate and give expression to what a people be-
lieves to be its collective destiny or ultimate meaning within a moral
universe."
If that is what the law is, and that is what religion is, it seems plain that, in a
democracy that cherishes its commitment to pluralism, religion would be one
of the guiding influences of the political discourse within which the law takes
shape.
This view of the law, however, is not the only one or even the dominant one.
Some scholars imagine that law is autonomous, a "law unto itself." This atti-
tude is common in American legal education today. It is part of the legacy of
Christopher Columbus Langdell, Dean of the Harvard Law School, who
nearly a hundred years ago made the case to the administration of Harvard
that law was not just a technique to be learned through apprenticeship to a
practitioner, but an intellectual discipline worthy of inclusion in the university
curriculum.1 2 Langdell argued that law is a science. Its raw data were appel-
late cases craving organization and coherence; its laboratory, the library of
those appellate cases.
Langdell thought of law as a discipline that may be understood apart from
considerations of persons and groups caught up in legal controversies. A major
controversy now rages within American law schools over the historical ap-
proach to the law. According to one school of thought, the substantive rules of
tort, commercial transactions, and property appear as a coherent body of ra-
tional principles arising from a series of disputes between private individuals
only when shorn of their historical context. Once the rules are situated within
their historical context, it becomes easier to observe in whose interest the rules
have functioned.
10. H. BERMAN, THE INTERACTION OF LAW AND RELIGION 24 (1973).
11. R. NEUHAUs, THE NAKED PUBLIC SQUARE 253 (1984).
12. Stevens, Two Cheers for 1870: The American Law School, 5 PERSP. IN LEGAL HIST. 403
(1971).
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It was also central to Langdell's view of law as a science that the reasoning
process inherent in legal thought distinguishes law from politics, which deals
merely with issues of power and with the expression of majority will. The no-
tion that law is readily divorced from politics has been challenged by legal
historians like Harvard law professor Morton Horwitz. Horwitz argued that
the close association of "law" with current social attitudes and the decisions of
an activist judiciary, has not only immersed American judges in contemporary
social issues, but has made a rigid separation of law from politics appear artifi-
cial. Horwitz acknowledges the radical potential of legal history:
Once legal history attempts to penetrate the distinction between law and
politics by seeing legal and jurisprudential change as a product of changing
social forces, it begins to undermine the indispensable ideological premise of
the legal profession-indeed of any profession-that its characteristic modes
of reasoning and its underlying substantive doctrines may not be universal
or necessary, but rather particular and contingent.13
Whether or not one agrees with Horwitz's interpretation of particular aspects
of legal history,' 4 it seems beyond cavil that policy, morals, and law have been
intertwined in American jurisprudence. In a similar vein, Yale Law professor
Robert Cover wrote eloquently and movingly of the danger of law divorced
from history, or what he called nomos without narrative."5
Although an intense political-if that term may fairly be attributed to aca-
demics-battle about these matters now rages within the very law school that
Langdell founded, the propositions that I have sketched above are by no
means the prerogative of the Left. For example, Boalt Hall law professor John
Noonan, himself a graduate of Harvard, returned to his alma mater in 1972 to
deliver, in his Holmes lectures, a scathing critique of the way that law is
taught in many American law schools, as a bundle of rules without connection
to the real flesh-and-blood persons caught up in the law's coercive power.e
13. Horwitz, The Conservative Tradition in the Writing of American Legal History, 17 AM. J.
LEGAL HIST. 275, 281 (1973).
14. For an example of a scholar who disagrees substantively with Horwitz, see G. WHITE, THE
AMERICAN JUDICIAL TRADITION (2d ed. 1988).
15. Cover, Foreword. Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARv. L. REV. 4 (1983); see also R. COVER,
JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1975).
16. J. NOONAN, PERSONS AND MASKS OF THE LAW: CARDOZO, HOLMES, JEFFERSON, AND
WYTHE AS MAKERS OF THE MASKS (1976). Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. is famous for his epigram,
"a page of history is worth a volume of logic." New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349
(1921). In a chapter devoted to Justice Holmes' treatment of American Banana Co. V. United
Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909), Noonan, however, shows that Holmes gave far greater weight to
the logic of corporate greed than to the sad history of "domination of [a] small country's govern-
ment by a predatory American business [the United Fruit Company] which had brutally sup-
pressed a challenge to its monopoly [by the American Fruit Company]. J. NOONAN, supra at 106.
Earlier, Noonan notes that Holmes viewed the Sherman Act as "a humbug based on economic
ignorance and incompetence." Id. at 102. This chapter in Noonan's volume illustrates the view of
Justice Holmes' father, the famous "autocrat of the breakfast table," who once remarked, "Junior
is willing to trade a principle for an epigram any day." A page or two of history later, despite
some recent gains in democratic reform in the hemisphere, the term "Yanqui" still connotes for
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Now a federal circuit judge, Noonan knows well the value of impartiality of
the rule of law.17 But he has remembered what some of us have forgotten, that
the common law has been forged not by contemplation of abstract principles
but by hammering on the anvil of human experience. That experience was
nearly always painful and often brutal to the losers in American legal history.
Noonan's most powerful illustration of this theme is the treatment of slaves in
Virginia by Thomas Jefferson and his law professor, George Wythe, both of
whom made the law of slavery in that commonwealth more severe after the
Revolution than it was in colonial Virginia."'
Although this emphasis on the flesh-and-blood historical persons who stand
behind the masks of the law is clearly helpful, it fairly invites attention to the
connection between law and politics. Legal rules do not simply resolve disputes
between two individuals, but have enormous political consequences for groups
within society. For that reason alone, it is appropriate to subject legal rules to
class analysis. For example, the "fellow servant" rule, which excused the own-
ers of the railroads for injuries caused to an employee by another employee,
clearly did not serve the interests of the servants. In the eyes of some histori-
ans, the way in which at least some legal rules benefited a certain class was no
accident, but was designed purposely to achieve this result from the beginning
of our republic.1"
Beyond obvious connections between law and history and between law and
politics, the connection between law and religion is now being paid greater
attention among scholars. One need not, of course, be a vulgar Marxist to
recognize a conscious design in the law. One may, for example, ascribe the
originating principles and driving goals of Western law to the general histori-
cal influence of biblical religion upon legal thought and legal institutions in the
West.
Whether or not one accepts a class-based view of the law, it has by now
become a common assumption in our culture that the law develops in response
to historical pressures. Although this assumption may seem self-evident, it
may not be taken for granted. It must be accounted for, if only because it was
not always made. In the legal philosophy of the ancient Greeks and Romans,
for example, law was thought of as temporal and unchanging. Modern cul-
ture, by contrast, extols change as a virtue. John Henry Newman reflected this
attitude in his famous Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine, in
which he noted that "[iln a higher world it is otherwise; but here below to live
is to change, and to be perfect is to have changed often."12' In modern system-
many Central Americans imperial domination by "el pulpo," unfair exploitation of human and
natural resources, and complicity with corrupt and brutal regimes.
17. J. NOONAN, supra note 16, at 14-16; J. NOONAN, BRIBES 183-86, 193-95, 234-37, 428-29
(1984).
18. J. NOONAN, supra note 16, at 29-64.
19. See, e.g., M. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860 (1976).
20. See, e.g., W. JAEGER, PAIDEIA: THE IDEALS OF GREEK CULTURE (1939).
21. J. NEWMAN, AN ESSAY ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE (1845).
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atical theology, Bernard Lonergan, a Canadian Jesuit, has likewise exploited
this critical distinction between classical consciousness and historical
consciousness."
One of the first legal scholars to exploit these categories systematically was
Harold Berman. Both in his 1975 lectures referred to above,28 and again in his
major study of the religious influence on Western law, 24 Berman has carefully
explored how the classical ideal of an eternal and changeless order gave way in
the West to the view that development and change are prominent features of
the legal order precisely because that order is grounded in the contingencies of
human history.This major theme of modern consciousness came to pass, in no small part,
because of the biblical world view with its profoundly different understanding
of time and history.25 In part because of these profoundly different attitudes
towards time and history, the Hebrew scriptures are replete with concern
about the political order and its mundane arrangements.
The biblical prophets demanded commitment both to stability of communal
life and to radical change necessitated by the particularities of the present
moment. This biblical attitude toward time infused the "new science" of the
law as it came into flower at the University of Bologna in the high Middle
Ages. Contrary to the views of Langdell, our medieval ancestors never
imagined that what they were doing with this discipline could be undertaken
without an understanding of philosophy and theology, as well as a study of
what we now call history, anthropology, sociology, and political science.
Just as law cannot truly be understood as a series of abstract principles
apart from the persons who shaped the law, so also, those persons cannot truly
be. understood as isolated individuals apart from the social context and com-
munal forces in which they lived. To understand the growth of American law,
one must understand the dynamic interrelationship between person and com-
munity which the law holds in constant tension. The rules of society emerge
because of the demands of persons, and the demands of persons are condi-
tioned by the social milieu in which they live.
Once the connection between law, history, politics, and religion is grasped,
the central proposition of this Article begins to emerge: that groups, including
religious organizations, as well as individuals, enjoy civil liberties. Several
scholars have written thoughtfully on this theme,26 which I will seek to illus-
22. B. LONERGAN, METHOD IN THEOLOGY (1972).
23. H. BERMAN, supra note 10, at 34-35.
24. H. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION (1983).
25. About a quarter of a century ago, it was fashionable to draw a sharp contrast between
Greek and Hebrew thought as to their conceptions of time and history. See, e.g., T. BOMAN, HE-
BREW THOUGHT COMPARED WITH GREEK (1960); 0. CULLMANN, CHRIST AND TIME (1950); C.
TRESMONTANT, A STUDY OF HEBREW THOUGHT 17-38 (1960). Some scholars, however, have cau-
tioned against overdoing the differences between the Greeks and the Hebrews on these matters.
See, e.g., J. BARR, THE SEMANTICS OF BIBLICAL LANGUAGE (1961).
26. See, e.g., Garet, Communality and Existence: The Rights of Groups, 56 S. CAL. L. REV.
1001 (1983); Gedicks, Toward a Constitutional Jurisprudence of Religious Group Rights, 1989
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trate here with just a few examples.
Civil liberties were achieved in this country largely through the collective
efforts of people acting in concert. For example, political speech is deemed the
civil liberty that represents the "central meaning of the first amendment" 7
because it is a condition precedent to other liberties. To be sure, this political
freedom may be exercised by each of us privately through personal reflec-
tion,"8 but it is lamentable that so few of us in this nonthinking era move
beyond such reflection to critical public discourse. Even though freedom of
expression is cherished as an attribute of personal dignity and individual lib-
erty, we should not lose sight of the fact that communication is always social,
always mediated. For example, from the first decade of our constitutional or-
der, political parties played a pivotal role in shaping political discourse. 9
They continue to do so today, even to the point of contributing to our current
political malaise and ennui. Labor organizations have played an equally vital
collective role in American politics,30 and the price paid for political dissent by
unions and their leaders has often been high."1 Because, as President Coolidge
put it, the business of America is business, it is also important to acknowledge
the powerful role that commercial corporations have played in American
politics. One has but to think of the advertisements of the Mobil Corporation
that appear regularly in our newspapers expressing a viewpoint on matters of
general public concern, not simply on issues directly related to the economic
interest of the stockholders narrowly conceived.
In fact, the leading case on corporate free speech, First National Bank of
Boston v. Bellotti,8' merits discussion here because it introduces the theme of
the speech rights of religious communities that forms a central concern of this
Article. At issue in Bellotti was a Massachusetts statute prohibiting expendi-
tures by banks and other for-profit corporations for the purpose of influencing
the vote on referendum proposals on any question "other than one materially
affecting any of the property, business or assets of the corporation. 3 The
Supreme Court invalidated the statute. Justice Powell suggested that to ask
whether corporations have free speech rights was to pose the wrong question,
and that the inquiry should focus on whether a statute "abridges expression
Wis. L. REV. 99.
27. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964); see also Whitney v. California,
274 U.S. 357, 375-76 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
28. In Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977), the Court gave greater weight to
this point than to the claim of labor unions to represent collectively the interests of their members
in political matters.
29. See Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent. 98 HARV. L. REV. 885, 923
(1985).
30. See, e.g., Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
31. See, e.g., Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919); In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564 (1895); see
also B. BROMMEL, EUGENE v. DEBs: SPOKESMAN FOR LABOR AND SOCIALISM (1978).
32. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
33. Id. at 768.
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that the First Amendment was meant to protect."'" The Court found that the
activity that the for-profit corporation wanted to engage in-publicizing its
views on a proposed amendment to the Massachusetts Constitution-lay "at
the heart of the First Amendment's protection. '35
Justice Powell articulated a general principle at the core of this Article's
concerns:
If the speakers here were not corporations, no one would suggest that the
State could silence their proposed speech. It is the type of speech indispensa-
ble to decision making in a democracy .... [The] inherent worth of the
speech in terms of its capacity for informing the public does not depend on
the identity of its source .... 36
Powell concluded:
In the realm of protected speech, the legislature is constitutionally dis-
qualified from dictating the subjects about which persons may speak and the
speakers who may address a public issue. If a legislature may direct business
corporations to "stick to business," it also may limit other corpora-
tions-religious, charitable, or civic-to their respective "business" when
addressing the public. Such power in government to channel the expression
of views is unacceptable under the First Amendment. Especially where, as
here, the legislature's suppression of speech suggests an attempt to give one
side of a debatable public question an advantage in expressing its views to
the people, the First Amendment is plainly offended.3 7
II. THE HISTORIC ROLE OF RELIGION IN AMERICAN POLITICS
Among the not-for-profit corporations or charitable organizations whose
speech has truly been "indispensable to decision making in a democracy," reli-
gious organizations have played a prominent role in the debates over social
issues of the highest moment. For this reason, the Williamsburg Charter, a
bicentennial document celebrating the meaning of the religion clauses of the
first amendment, could state:
The assertion of moral judgments as though they were morally neutral, and
interpretations of the "wall of separation" that would exclude religious ex-
pression and argument from public life ... contradict freedom of conscience
and the genius of the [first amendment religion clauses] .... Too often in
recent disputes over religion and public affairs, some have insisted that any
evidence of religious influence on public policy represents an establishment
of religion and is therefore precluded as an improper "imposition." Such
exclusion of religion from public life is historically unwarranted, philosoph-
ically inconsistent and profoundly undemocratic .... Many of the most dy-
namic social movements in American history, including that of civil rights,
34. Id. at 776.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 777 (emphasis added).
37. Id. at 784-86. (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
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were legitimately inspired and shaped by religious motivation.'8
From the beginning of the American experience there has been a vivid con-
nection between religion and politics."' This connection was not absent from
the history of taxation in America. Because of its potentially comprehensive
scope, taxation is the most significant mechanism of governmental power. It is
the predicate for all the other functions of government. For that very reason,
the most important tax revolt in this nation's history was joined to ideas of
representative democracy in this country's revolution against the British
Crown. That revolt was in turn linked to America's religious history, for the
colonists had incorporated into the American experience a variety of practices
related to the financial support of established or preferred religious groups.4 0
The colonists who began the struggle over religious liberty, principally the
Baptists and the Quakers in New England, reacted strongly against these
practices."' The late seventeenth-century and early eighteenth-century struggle
for exemption of dissenting Protestants from taxation to support the estab-
lished church (Congregational in New England, Anglican in the southern colo-
nies) turned out to be the seedbed of political revolt against the Crown under
the rallying cry, "No taxation without representation." For example, in his
famous Memorial to the Massachusetts Assembly in 1775, the prominent Bap-
tist preacher Isaac Backus wrote:
Our real grievances are that we, as well as our fathers, have from time to
time been taxed on religious accounts where we were not represented .... Is
not all America now appealing to Heaven against the injustice of being
taxed where we are not represented, and against being judged by men who
are interested in getting away our money? And will heaven approve of your
doing the same thing to your fellow servants? No, surely. We have no desire
of representing this government as the worst of any who have imposed reli-
38. The Williamsburg Charter: A Celebration and Reaffirmation of the Religious Liberty
Clauses, reprinted in 8 J.L. & RELIG. - (1990). For a lucid commentary on this passage from
the charter, see Kelley, The Intermeddling Manifesto, Or, The Role of Religious Bodies in Af-
fecting Public Policy in the United States, 8 J.L. & RELIG. - (1990).
39. For an excellent study of the interaction of religion and politics in the colonial era, see P.
BONOMI, UNDER THE COPE OF HEAVEN: RELIGION, SOCIETY AND POLITICS IN COLONIAL
AMERICA (1986); for studies of the founding generation, see J. EIDSMOE, CHRISTIANITY AND THE
CONSTITUTION: THE FAITH OF OUR FOUNDING FATHERS (1987); E. GAUSTAD, FAITH OF OUR
FATHERS: RELIGION AND THE NEW NATION (1988); "IN GOD WE TRUST": THE RELIGIOUS BE-
LIEFS AND IDEAS OF THE AMERICAN FOUNDING FATHERS (N. Cousins ed. 1958); W. MILLER, THE
FIRST LIBERTY: RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC (1986); THE VIRGINIA STATUTE FOR
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM: ITS EVOLUTION AND CONSEQUENCES IN AMERICAN HISTORY (M. Peterson
& Robert C. Vaughan, eds. 1988).
40. For a description of these practices, see T. CURRY, THE FIRST FREEDOMS: CHURCH AND
STATE IN AMERICA TO THE PASSAGE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 136-46, 151-57, 181, 189, 191-92,
210-11 (1986). See also C. ANTIEAU, A. DOWNEY, & E. ROBERTS, FREEDOM FROM FEDERAL Es-
TABLISHMENT: FORMATION AND EARLY HISTORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT RELIGION CLAUSES
(1964).
41. The definitive study of this movement is W. McLOUGHLIN, NEW ENGLAND DISSENT, 1630-
1833: THE BAPTISTS AND THE SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE (1971).
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gious taxes; we fully believe the contrary. Yet, as we are persuaded that an
entire freedom from being taxed by civil rulers to religious worship is not a
mere favor from any man or men in the world but a right and property
granted us from God, who commands us to stand fast in it, we have not only
the same reason to refuse an acknowledgment of such a taxing power here,
as America has the abovesaid power, but also, according to our present
light, we should wrong our consciences in allowing that power to men, which
we believe belongs only to God.'"
Perhaps the clearest example of the shaping influence of religion on Ameri-
can public policy occurred in the debate over slavery. From the outset, the
voice of some religious communities, notably the Quakers, was unambiguously
clear about the matter, allowing slaves to be purchased only for the purpose of
their emancipation.'1 Quakers such as Thomas Garrett were prominent among
the "conductors" of the underground railroad," and William Lloyd Garrison,
perhaps the best known of the abolitionists, was reared as a Quaker in his
early years.""
The shift in the 1830s towards radical abolitionism reached a fever pitch
because of the revivalist preaching of evangelical Christians such as Charles
Grandison Finney and Theodore Dwight Weld.' In the spring of 1834, Finney
and Weld conducted a series of prayer meetings and intense lectures at Lane
Theological Seminary in Cincinnati about the immorality of slavery.", They
"won over almost the entire student body to the support of immediate aboli-
tion,"' 8 but the cost of their success was that the trustees tried to restrain
them. Rather than moderate their convictions, they left Lane and went to
Oberlin College, which they transformed into a major institution of higher
42. Memorial of the Warren Association, reprinted in 2 THE ANNALS OF AMERICA 366 (1968);
see also W. McLOUGHLIN, supra note 41, at 441-76.
43. See S. AHLSTROM, A RELIGIOUS HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 650, 699 (1972); 2 A.
STOKES, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES 176-79 (1950).
44. See W. BREYFOGLE, MAKE-FREE: STORY OF THE UNDERGROUND RAILROAD (1958); H.
BUCKMASTER (pseudonym), LET MY PEOPLE Go: THE STORY OF THE UNDERGROUND RAILROAD
AND THE GROWTH OF THE ABOLITION MOVEMENT (1941); L. GARA, THE LIBERTY LINE: THE
LEGEND OF THE UNDER-GROUND RAILROAD (1961); M. MCDOUGALL, FUGITIVE SLAVES (1891);
W. SIEBERT, THE UNDERGROUND RAILROAD FROM SLAVERY TO FREEDOM (1967 ed.); W. STILL,
THE UNDERGROUND RAILROAD (1872).
45. See M. NOLL, ONE NATION UNDER GOD?-CHRISTIAN FAITH AND POLITICAL ACTION IN
AMERICA 114-15 (1988).
46. For the early period, see J. EssIG, THE BONDS OF WICKEDNESS: AMERICAN EVANGELICALS
AGAINST SLAVERY, 1770-1808 (1982). On Finney, see KEITH J. HARDMAN, CHARLES GRANDISON
FINNEY, 1792-1875: REVIVALIST AND REFORMER (1987). On Weld, see R. ABZUG, PASSIONATE
LIBERATOR: THEODORE DWIGHT WELD AND THE DILEMMA OF REFORM (1980).
47. For a classic study of the role of religion in the early period of the antislavery movement,
see G. BARNES, THE ANTI-SLAVERY IMPULSE, 1830-1844 (1933). Other sources include L. FILLER,
THE CRUSADE AGAINST SLAVERY, 1830-1860 (1960); E. MADDEN, CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE AND
MORAL LAW IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY (1968); Stewart, Abolitionists,
the Bible, and the Challenge of Slavery, in THE BIBLE AND SOCIAL REFORM 31-57 (E. Sandeen
ed. 1982).
48. M. NOLL, supra note 45, at 113.
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learning (the first to admit women on a basis equal to men). Oberlin became
an important stop on the underground railroad, and it turned out hundreds of
abolitionist evangelists who spread across the northern Midwest preaching that
the Gospel of Christ demanded the abolition of slavery.
As Finney put it in his Lectures on Revivals of Religion in 1835: "Let
Christians of all denominations . . . give forth and write on the head of this
great abomination, SIN, and in three years, a public sentiment would be
formed that would carry all before it, and there would not be a shackled slave,
nor a bristling, cruel slavedriver in this land."49 Slavery did not disappear in
1838, but the flame had been fanned, and there would be no turning back
until the adoption of the thirteenth amendment.
Abundant other examples of the use of religious discourse in the debates
over slavery could be offered." It is no accident that when the abolitionists
burned a copy of the federal constitution because of its flawed compromise on
slavery, they used the language of scripture to reflect their moral outrage,
describing the constitution as a "compact with death, a covenant with hell." 51
Similarly, John Brown's last statement to the district court that had sentenced
him to death for his part in liberating slaves is likewise shot through with
religious imagery. Brown acknowledged his role in the underground railroad,
yet denied everything but "the design on my part to free the slaves ... without
the snapping of a gun."52 Denying in particular the charge that he intended
"murder, or treason, or the destruction of property, or to excite or incite slaves
to rebellion, or to make insurrection," Brown continued with a tissue of allu-
sions to scripture:
This Court acknowledges, as I suppose, the validity of the law of God. I see
a book kissed here which I suppose to be the Bible .... That teaches me
that all things whatsoever I would that man should do to me, I should even
do so to them. It teaches me further to "remember them that are in bonds,
as bound with them." I endeavored to act up to that instruction. I am yet
too young to understand that God is any respecter of persons. I believe that
to have interfered as I have done ... in behalf of His despised poor, was not
wrong, but right. Now, if it be deemed necessary that I should forfeit my
life for the furtherance of the ends of justice, and mingle my blood with the
blood of my children and with the blood of millions in this slave country
whose rights are disregarded by wicked, cruel and unjust enactments,-I
submit; so let it be done! 3
49. C. FINNEY, LECTURES ON REVIVALS OF RELIGION 286 (1886), cited in M. NOLL, supra note
45, at 112.
50. See, e.g., A. REICHLEY, RELIGION IN AMERICAN PUBLIC LIFE 188-98 (1985).
51. See P. PALUDAN, A COVENANT WITH DEATH: THE CONSTITUTION, LAW, AND EQUITY IN
THE CIVIL WAR ERA (1975) (referring to Isaiah 28:15).
52. John Brown's Last Statement to Court, Nov. 2, 1859, reprinted in BLACK PROTEST: HIS-
TORY, DOCUMENTS, AND ANALYSES, 1619 TO THE PRESENT 81 (J. Grant ed. 1968).
53. Id. at 82. The classic text stating the Golden Rule is Matthew 7:12. On remembrance of
the fetters of an imprisoned person, see Colossians 4:18; Matthew 25:36. On liberation of those in
bondage, see Isaiah 61:1, Luke 4:18. On intervention on behalf of the poor, see Luke 1:51-53. On
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It is fair to note, however, the Bible was used authoritatively and with in-
tense vigor both by opponents and proponents of slavery. 5' To put things
mildly, some Christian denominations offered teaching on the slavery question
that at best was ambiguous, and at worst was complicit in the cruelty of the
"peculiar institution." For example, the Lutheran Synod of Virginia resolved
in 1835, "That we discountenance the circulation of all so-called religious pa-
pers, which are designed to support the cause of the abolitionists." '55 In so
doing the Synod was plainly acting out of Lutheran convictions in response to
the well known abolitionist impulses of the Franckean Synod, which believed
that "slavery as it exists in the United States [is] a sin ...opposed to the
spirit of the Gospel."56 Similarly, Methodists in Baltimore asserted as early as
1790 that "slavery is contrary to the laws of God." When Methodists were
required in 1844, during the heyday of radical abolitionism, to emancipate any
slaves they owned, this move split the Methodist Church into northern and
southern branches. A similar denominational rupture occurred among the
Baptists and the Presbyterians. It has taken over a century for some of these
breaches to heal; to this day not all of them have been healed. In any event,
during the most decisive debates in American history on the issue of liberty,
religious discourse played a significant political role.
The range of political or social issues about which religious groups have
voiced their religious concerns is considerable. For example, however one as-
sesses the impact of Marxist criticism of our economic order, it has not been
nearly as effective on its own terms-in praxis-as the structural challenges
emanating from religious leaders who have repeatedly addressed the recurrent
problem of distributive justice in America. Once again, however, it would be
appropriate to observe that these commentaries on the American economy
have reflected a spectrum of views from the Social Gospel of Walter Raus-
chenbusch to Andrew Carnegie's famous sermon, "The Gospel of Wealth,"
from the Catholic Bishops' recent Pastoral Letter, to Michael Novak's spirited
defense of "democratic capitalism." 7
suffering for the sake of justice, see Matthew 5:10-12; 1 Peter 3:14. "Amen" is the Hebrew word
used throughout the Bible for acceptance of reality or submission in faith to God's word. For an
account of Brown's activities as a conductor on the underground railroad, the raid on Harper's
Ferry, Brown's trial, and the Northern reaction to his execution, see H. BUCKMASTER, supra note
44, at 256-70.
54. See, e.g., Stewart, Abolitionists, the Bible, and the Challenge of Slavery, in THE BIBLE
AND SOCIAL REFORM 31-57 (E. Sandeen, ed. 1982). 1 have discussed the use of religious discourse
in American politics in a review of a chapter of Michael Perry's recent volume, MORALITY, POLIT-
ICS AND LAW (1988). See Gaffney, Politics Without Brackets on Religious Convictions: Michael
Perry and Bruce Ackerman on Neutrality, 64 TUL. L. REv. 1143 (1990).
55. Cited in 2 A. STOKES. supra note 43, at 184.
56. Id. at 182.
57. Compare EcONOMIC JUSTICE FOR ALL: PASTORAL LETTER ON CATHOLIC SOCIAL THINKING
AND THE U.S. ECONOMY (1986) with M; NOVAK, THE SPIRIT OF DEMOCRATIC CAPITALISM
(1982). See also D. MCCANN, NEW EXPERIMENT IN DEMOCRACY: THE CHALLENGE FOR AMERI-
CAN CATHOLICISM (1987); M. MEEKS. GOD THE ECONOMIST: THE DOCTRINE OF GOD AND POLITI-
CAL ECONOMY (1989); M. STACKHOUSE, PUBLIC THEOLOGY AND POLITICAL ECONOMY: CHRIS-
1990]
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Problems in the administration of criminal justice have also been the subject
of religious concern, from the attack on the brutal forms of incarceration at
the dawn of the republic made by the Society of Friends, to recent statements
on capital punishment issued by nearly every major religious body.' The re-
currence of the retributive theme has also been a potent force."9
Now that technology has developed weapons of mass destruction with the
capacity of global annihilation, the reflections of religious communities in the
contemporary debate on the legitimacy of violence to resolve international dis-
putes has become acute. Once again, however, even on these questions of su-
preme moment, there is nothing like unanimity among religious voices even on
the principles, let alone on their application.60
Women's rights have been championed through powerful use of religious
language; one has but to think of Elizabeth Cady Stanton's famous Women's
Bible. It may come as a surprise to some that religious groups were instrumen-
tal in launching the movement for women's suffrage.6 On the other hand, the
predicates of the patriarchal culture of the ancient world from which most
religious groups derive their origin still keep many of these groups from treat-
ing women with the equal dignity they deserve as persons in today's society.
Finally, religious organizations offer support and consolation to those af-
flicted with the disease of alcoholism and addiction to other drugs, both by
sponsoring counselling programs and by offering hospitality to 12-Step pro-
grams of spiritual recovery such as Alcoholics Anonymous and AI-Anon." On
TIAN STEWARDSHIP IN MODERN SOCIETY (1987); P. WOGAMAN, CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES ON
POLITICS 209-29 (1988); King, The Biblical Base of the Social Gospel, in THE BIBLE AND SOCIAL
REFORM 59-84 (E. Sandeen ed. 1982).
58. See, e.g., CRIME AND THE RESPONSIBLE COMMUNITY (J. Stott & N. Miller eds. 1980); THE
DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA (H. Bedau ed. 1982); G. McHUGH, CHRISTIAN FAITH AND CRIMI-
NAL JUSTICE: TOWARD A CHRISTIAN RESPONSE TO CRIME AND PUNISHMENT (1978); D. VANNESS,
CRIME AND ITS VICTIMS: WHAT WE CAN Do (1986); P. WOGAMAN, supra note 57, at 247-61.
59. See, e.g., W. BERNS, FOR CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: CRIME AND THE MORALITY OF THE DEATH
PENALTY (1979).
60. Compare, e.g., G. WEIGEL, TRANQUILLITAS ORDINIS: THE PRESENT FAILURE AND FUTURE
PROMISE OF AMERICAN CATHOLIC THOUGHT ON WAR AND PEACE (1987) with J. FINNIS, G.
GRISEZ & J. BOYLE, NUCLEAR DETERRENCE, MORALITY AND REALISM (1987). Similar contrast is
afforded by the essays by John Howard Yoder, William Spohn, Paul Seabury, John C. Bennett,
and George Weigel collected in WAR No MORE? OPTIONS IN NUCLEAR ETHICS (J. Walters ed.
1989). See also Chatfield, The Bible and American Peace Movements, in THE BIBLE AND SOCIAL
REFORM 105-31 (E. Sandeen ed. 1982).
61. See, e.g., Zikmund, Biblical Arguments and Women's Place in the Church, in THE BIBLE
AND SOCIAL REFORM 85-104 (E. Sandeen ed. 1982).
62. For a discussion of the spiritual character of the twelve steps of recovery recommended by
Bill Wilson, the co-founder of Alcoholics Anonymous, see ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS (3d ed.
1976); CAME TO BELIEVE: THE SPIRITUAL ADVENTURE OF A.A. AS EXPERIENCED BY INDIVIDUAL
MEMBERS (1979); THE TWELVE STEPS AND TWELVE TRADITIONS (1981); TWENTY-FOUR HOURS A
DAY (1981). Al-Anon is a parallel movement for the recovery of those who are affected by the
alcoholism of a friend or family member. For samples of the literature of this movement, see AL-
ANON FACES ALCOHOLISM (2d ed. 1984); ALATEEN: HOPE FOR CHILDREN OF ALCOHOLICS
(1985).
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the other hand, some religious groups seem to think that the inducement of
guilt and toxic shame is an appropriate way to deal with alcoholics and ad-
dicts.68 Evangelical Christians provided the leadership and driving force in the
movement to ban the sale and consumption of alcohol in the earlier part of the
twentieth century. Though dubbed "the noble experiment," the eighteenth
amendment is typically regarded as a failure because of its severe restriction
of human freedom, and because of two persistent evils that arose in the Prohi-
bition era: organized crime and massive governmental surveillance. The social
benefit of other dimensions of Prohibition, including a marked decrease in
heart disease, venereal disease, and births out of wedlock, is rarely factored
into the calculus. 6' I, for one, am grateful for the repeal of Prohibition, but no
matter how one assays the value of the eighteenth amendment, its repeal by
the twenty-first amendment left the issue of the sale and consumption of alco-
hol subject to regulation at the state and local level, where several religious
groups still campaign against the sale of liquor.65
In the face of the historical evidence sketched here, one cannot sustain the
claim that religious bodies have been an unmitigated force for good whenever
they have drawn connections between their religious convictions and American
politics.66 In this respect, religious organizations are like political parties. One
63. For the distinction between shame that is related to moral responsibility and shame that is
toxic, see J. BRADSHAW, HEALING THE SHAME THAT BINDS (1988).
64. For a good description of the role of the fundamentalists in the Prohibition movement, see
G. MARSDEN, FUNDAMENTALISM IN AMERICAN CULTURE (1980). See also S. AHLSTROM, supra
note 43, at 870-71, 902-04; R. FOWLER, RELIGION AND POLITICS IN AMERICA 140-45 (1985); M.
NOLL. supra note 45, at 128-41; 2 A. STOKES. supra note 43, at 328-44. For more thorough
treatment of this theme, see N. CLARK, DELIVER Us FROM EVIL: AN INTERPRETATION OF AMERI-
CAN PROHIBITION (1976); V. DABNEY, DRY MESSIAH: THE LIFE OF BISHOP CANNON (1949); L.
ENGELMANN, INTEMPERANCE: THE LOST WAR AGAINST LIQUOR (1979); J. GUSFIELD, SYMBOLIC
CRUSADE: STATUS POLITICS AND THE AMERICAN TEMPERANCE MOVEMENT (1963); J. KOBLER,
ARDENT SPIRITS: THE RISE AND FALL OF PROHIBITION (1973); J. TIMBERLAKE, PROHIBITION AND
THE PROGRESSIVE MOVEMENT, 1900-1920 (1966).
65. Thirteen local congregations in rural Tennessee that sponsored paid advertisements on a
local referendum concerning the sale of liquor by the drink discovered to their amazement that the
Attorney General of Tennessee insisted on applying to these churches the full force of the state's
campaign financial disclosure act. In the view of the Tennessee Supreme Court, the state may
require religious bodies wishing to express biblically based views on a matter of public concern:
(1) to register with the state as a political campaign committee before accepting any contributions
to further any kind of political speech; (2) to elect a special officer of the church designated as a
political treasurer; and (3) to file with the state detailed financial statements, including the names
and addresses of all persons who contribute more than $100 to the church for the purpose of
voicing its moral concerns about a referendum issue. Bemis Pentecostal Church v. State, 731
S.W.2d 897 (1987), appeal dismissed, 485 U.S. 930 (1988).
66. For a thoughtful and nuanced discussion of the history of religious involvement in Ameri-
can politics, see M. NOLL, supra note 45; RELIGION AND AMERICAN POLITICS (M. Noll ed. 1989).
The literature on this theme in the past decade alone has been impressive. See, e.g., R. FOWLER,
supra note 64; K. GREENAWALT, RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS AND POLITICAL CHOICE (1988); R.
McBRIEN, CAESAR'S COIN: RELIGION AND POLITICS IN AMERICA (1987); C. MOONEY, PUBLIC
VIRTUE: LAW AND THE SOCIAL CHARACTER OF RELIGION (1986); M. PERRY, MORALITY, POLITICS
AND LAW: A BICENTENNIAL ESSAY (1988); THE POLITICAL ROLE OF RELIGION IN THE UNITED
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can, however, note a constant interaction between religion and politics on all
the large issues confronted in American politics. Even where the churches
have been wrong, in a pluralistic society they must nevertheless be given the
dignity of their mistakes. Their errors are best corrected by stating counter-
arguments, not by stilling their voices.
III. THEOLOGICAL REASONS FOR THE ROLE OF RELIGION
IN AMERICAN POLITICS
Why do religious groups engage in political activity? As a prominent Meth-
odist theologian, Philip Wogaman, notes in his recent volume, Christian Per-
spectives on Politics, the answers to that question are "many and varied."6
Identifying himself as a mainstream liberal Protestant, Wogaman acknowl-
edges that valuable insights are to be gained from three other distinctive gen-
erating centers of socio-political ethics: Christian pacifists and anarchists;
Christian liberationists; and Christian neoconservatives. Wogaman locates Jac-
ques Ellul, a prolific French Calvinist, at one end of the spectrum because of
his seemingly antipolitical or "anarchist" stance. When subjected to closer
scrutiny by Wogaman, however, Ellul turns out to be more complicated than
the "anarchist" label lets on. For example, he urges Christians to engage in all
political parties and movements, but without any illusion that our problems
can actually be solved through politics."8
Wogaman also places John Howard Yoder, a leading American Mennonite
theologian, in the same general camp as Ellul. He does so because of Yoder's
insistence that the politics of Jesus (utter renunciation of violence) should be
the way of Christians, who should not temporize in their obedience to God's
will, as demonstrated by Jesus. 9 According to Yoder, such obedience should
not even be temporized to be more "effective" because it is God's responsibil-
ity, not ours, to manage the course of history and to bring to pass the triumph
of his justice and righteousness in his own time."0 Wogaman notes, however,
that in an earlier volume Yoder acknowledged the legitimacy of Christian wit-
ness to the state, and the moral superiority of some political alternatives over
others: "No tyrant can be so low on the scale of righteousness that the Chris-
tian could not appeal to him to do at least a little better; no 'Christianized'
STATES (S. Johnson & J. Tamney eds. 1986); A. REICHLEY, supra note 50, at 168-339. For a
thoughtful collection of essays on the resurgence of interest in politics among Evangelical Chris-
tians, see PIETY AND POLITICS: EVANGELICALS AND FUNDAMENTALISTS CONFRONT THE WORLD
(R. Neuhaus & M. Cromartie eds. 1987); R. WUTHNOW, THE STRUGGLE FOR AMERICA'S SOUL:
EVANGELICALS, LIBERALS & SECULARISM (1989). See also Commager, Religion and Politics in
American History, in RELIGION AND POLITICS 37-56 (J. Wood, Jr., ed. 1983).
67. P. WOGAMAN, supra note 57, at 31.
68. J. ELLUL, THE ETHICS OF FREEDOM 379-80 (1976); see also J. ELLUL, THE POLITICS OF
GOD AND THE POLITICS OF MAN (1972); J. ELLUL, THE POLITICAL ILLUSION (1967).
69. See J. YODER, THE POLITICS OF JESUS (1972).
70. See id. The summary of Yoder's central thesis is found in P. WOGAMAN, supra note 57, at
42.
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society can be so transformed as not to need constant criticism." '71
Wogaman does not discuss Johann Baptist Metz, a German theologian who
coined the phrase "political theology." Like Ellul and Yoder, Metz insists that
every abstract idea of progress and of humanity stands under God's future
promises or "eschatological proviso":
No doubt, these promises cannot simply be identified with any condition of
society, however we may determine and describe it from our point of view.
The history of Christianity has had enough experience of such direct identi-
fication and direct "politifications" of the Christian promises. In such cases,
however, the "eschatological proviso," which makes every historically real
status of society appear to be provisional, was being abandoned. 2
Unlike Ellul and Yoder, however, Metz takes a sharp turn from this pre-
mise towards engagement in the socio-political order: "It is impossible to
privatize the eschatological promises of biblical tradition: liberty, peace, jus-
tice, reconciliation. Again and again they force us to assume our responsibili-
ties towards society."'7 He insists that the salvific relation of Jesus to the
world is "not to be understood in a natural-cosmological sense but in a socio-
political sense; that is, as a critical, liberating force in regard to the social
world and its historical process." '74
Picking up on this theme, Gustavo Gutierrez and a number of other Latin
American theologians have explored a way of describing the entire theological
enterprise as one of liberation.75 As the debate over liberation theology demon-
71. J. YODER, THE CHRISTIAN WITNESS TO THE STATE 59 (1964).
72. Metz, The Church and World in the Light of a "Political Theology," in THEOLOGY OF THE
WORLD 114 (1971). In this respect the distinguished American Catholic ethicist, Charles Curran,
agrees: "The Christian strives to make the kingdom more present in this world, but the fullness of
justice and peace will never be here. I maintain there can be some truly human progress in his-
tory, but such progress is ordinarily slow and painful." C. CURRAN, AMERICAN CATHOLIC SOCIAL
ETHICS: TWENTIETH CENTURY APPROACHES 284 (1982). A Niebuhrian Protestant for whom the
pervasive realities of original sin and original grace are equally important would doubtless agree
about the slow pace of progress, but would perhaps stress that only God makes his kingdom pre-
sent in this world. See, e.g., R. NIEBUHR, THE CHILDREN OF LIGHT AND THE CHILDREN OF DARK-
NESS (1944). Echoing Niebuhr, Metz concluded his seminal essay on political theology: "The irra-
tionalities of our actions in the social and political field are too manifest. There is still with us the
possibility that 'collective darkness' will descend upon us. The danger of losing freedom, justice,
and peace is, indeed, so great that indifference in these matters would be a crime." Metz, supra,
at 124.
73. Metz, supra note 72, at 114.
74. Id. See also J. METZ, FAITH IN HISTORY AND SOCIETY: TOWARD A PRACTICAL FUNDAMEN-
TAL THEOLOGY 49-83 (1980).
75. The principal Latin American theologians who have written in this vein are H. ASSMANN,
THEOLOGY FOR A NOMAD CHURCH (1976); J. BONINo, TOWARD A CHRISTIAN POLITIC ETHICS
(1983); J. BONINO, DOING THEOLOGY IN A REVOLUTIONARY SITUATION (1975); G. GUTIERREZ,
LIBERATION THEOLOGY (1973); and J. SEGUNDO. LIBERATION OF THEOLOGY (1976). For a dis-
cussion of these theologians, see P. WOGAMAN, supra note 57, at 53-71; for a comparison of politi-
cal theology and liberation theology, see Fiorenza, Political Theology as Foundational Theology,
in 32 PROCEEDINGS OF THE CATHOLIC THEOLOGICAL SOCIETY OF AMERICA 142 (L. Salm ed.
1977).
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strates, moreover, the answers to the complex question posed above-why do
religious groups engage in political activity?-divide contemporary members
of the same religious community, much in the way that the abolition of slavery
divided the mainline Protestant communions in the nineteenth century.
In the North American context, there has likewise been considerable diver-
sity of theological justifications for engagement by religious groups in politics.
It must, however, be noted that some religious groups maintain that a strong
case should be made for nonengagement. Representatives of.this position in-
clude the Society of Friends (Quakers), the Mennonite Church and the
Church of the Brethren." James Reichley suggests that "Quakerism might
survive and even flourish as a dedicated sect within or attached to a more
worldly host community. It offered a spiritually attractive alternative way of
life and could provide the host community with effective moral criticism and
correction .... "" Reichley concludes that the Quakers' commitment to paci-
fism, however morally impressive, does not meet the acid test of "political real-
ism."78 To subject their views to this test, however, misses the point that the
traditional peace churches are more concerned with the faithfulness of their
witness and the integrity of their lives than with the result of transforming the
society around them. If the propensity of American culture to resolve disputes
by resorting to violence is diminished because of the witness of the traditional
peace churches, so much the better. But even if our government insists on the
legitimacy of war, Quakers, Mennonites, and other pacifists will nevertheless
prefer to die than to kill.
As for religious theories encouraging engagement in the political order,
Mark Noll finds Calvinist thought, with its emphasis on the need for the
church to produce faithful witnesses to the sovereignty of God while serving as
civil magistrates, to be central to American politics.79 Roman Catholic social
thought is reflected not only in the prodigious outpouring of the American
hierarchy on a wide variety of social issues, 0 but also in the work of thinkers
as diverse as John Courtney Murray8 and Dorothy Day.82 Another example
76. For an empathetic description of the role of the peace churches in American history, see P.
BROCK, PACIFISM IN THE UNITED STATES: COLONIAL ERA TO THE FIRST WORLD WAR (1968). For
accounts of the Quakers, see M. BACON, QUIET REBELS: STORY OF THE QUAKERS IN AMERICA
(1969); H. KERSHNER, QUAKER SERVICE IN MODERN WAR (1950); W. WILLIAMS, THE RICH
HERITAGE OF QUAKERISM (1962). For a thoughtful and nuanced discussion of the political
thought of the radical wing of the Reformation, see generally J. YODER, THE CHRISTIAN WITNESS
TO THE STATE (1964).
77. A. REICHLEY, supra note 50, at 174.
78. Id.
79. See M. NOLL, supra note 45.
80. Two pastoral letters of the American Catholic Bishops during the past decade are well
known: THE CHALLENGE OF PEACE: GOD'S PROMISE AND OUR RESPONSE (1983); ECONOMIC JUS-
TICE FOR ALL (1986). The collected statements of the bishops from the inception of the National
Catholic Welfare Conference in 1917 to the present fill four volumes.
81. See, e.g., J. MURRAY, WE HOLD THESE TRUTHS: REFLECTIONS ON THE AMERICAN EXPERI-
ENCE (1960). For careful studies of Murray, see J. HOOPER, THE ETHICS OF DISCOURSE: THE
SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN COURTNEY MURRAY (1986); R. MCELROY, THE SEARCH FOR AN
AMERICAN PUBLIC THEOLOGY: THE CONTRIBUTION OF JOHN COURTNEY MURRAY (1989).
82. See D. DAY, THE LONG LONELINESS (1981); W. MILLER, DOROTHY DAY: A BIOGRAPHY
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of fruitful interaction between religion and politics in America has been the
Lutheran retrieval of the Augustinian tension between the two cities or
kingdoms. 88
What unifies these various approaches, however, is the conviction that politi-
cal action by religious groups is not "meddling" in something beyond their
ken, but an important (for some, even a constitutive) dimension of their reli-
gious experience and commitment.
In testimony before the House Ways and Means Committee in 1972, the
late John Baker, a representative of the Baptist Joint Committee on Public
Affairs, noted both the theological pluralism of approaches to political action,
and the unity of conviction that this involvement is deeply religious:
Some religious entities believe that their religious faith commits them to a
complete withdrawal from the secular world. Others are compelled by their
faith into an active participation in nearly every aspect of that secular
world. If they are to be good stewards of their religious influence these peo-
ple sincerely believe they must be involved in the formation of public policy.
War and peace, human welfare, civil rights, abortion, and education are all
public issues, but they have attributes which make them also religious is-
sues. The list of these areas of governmental involvement with society which
some of the churches assert also demand religious involvement is almost
infinite.
84
A representative of the National Jewish Community Relations Advisory
Council ("NJCRAC") likewise supported participation by religious organiza-
tions in legislative matters on religious grounds:
Not everyone, or even all Jews, will agree that every policy decision made by
each of the organizations is inescapably required by the Jewish religious
tradition. However, none may question the sincerity of these organizations
in concluding that their activities are designed to express their view of what
Jewish tradition requires. The members of these organizations have banded
together because they are Jews and believe that they have a responsibility to
express a Jewish point of view. If they were not moved by that belief, they
would have formed or joined other organizations to speak for them on sub-
jects such as freedom, equality, and urban unrest. They believe, however,
that they have a responsibility to discover and express whatever guidance
may be found in the Jewish tradition on such issues. Thus, their activity is a
form of religious expression.88
(1982); W. MILLER, A HARSH AND DREADFUL LOVE (1970).
83. The policy statements of the Lutheran Church in America are reprinted as appendices in C.
KLEIN & C. VON DEHSEN, POLITICS AND POLICY: THE GENESIS AND THEOLOGY OF SOCIAL STATE-
MENTS IN THE LUTHERAN CHURCH IN AMERICA 179-290 (1989). For the reflections of one of
America's most distinguished Lutheran theologians, see M. MARTY, RELIGION AND REPUBLIC:
THE AMERICAN CIRCUMSTANCE (1987).
84. House Hearings, supra note 1, at 282 (statement of John W. Baker).
85. Id. at 99.
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On behalf of the United Methodist Church, Dr. J. Elliott Corbett entered
into the record of these hearings the following policy declaration of the Gen-
eral Conference of his communion:
We believe that churches have the right and the duty to speak and act cor-
porately on those matters of public policy which involve basic moral or ethi-
cal issues and questions. Any concept of church-government relations which
denies churches this role in the body politic strikes at the very core of the
religious liberty. The attempt to influence the formation and execution of
public policy at all levels of government is often the most effective means
available to churches to keep before modern man the ideal of a society in
which power [is] made to serve the ends of justice and freedom for all
people."
Corbett then testified as follows:
This statement makes clear that the church should speak out on public pol-
icy questions and seek to influence the formation of public policy as it re-
lates to the government: The declaration points out the inappropriateness of
denying the church its role in relating to public policy and that such a denial
would threaten religious liberty. The question here arises as to whether "the
free exercise" of religion, as provided in the first amendment is denied if
limitations are placed on church lobbying in areas affecting the church's
purpose in society. In other words, the first amendment guarantees of "the
free exercise" of religion should not permit the state to tell the church when
it is being "religious" and when it is not. The church must be permitted to
define its own goals in society in terms of the imperatives of its religious
faith. Is the Christian church somehow not being religious when it works on
behalf of healing the sick, or for the rights of minorities, or as peacemaker
on the international scene? No, the church itself must define the perimeters
of its outreach on public policy questions."
Four years later, in similar hearings before the House Ways and Means
Committee on legislation to regulate the lobbying efforts of exempt organiza-
tions, representatives of religious bodies were even more emphatic than in their
earlier testimony that attempts to regulate the participation of religious bodies
in matters of public concern create special constitutional problems of abridge-
ment of free exercise of religion.88
The testimony referred to above illustrates the sense in which the separation
of religiously-based morality from the realm of public policy choices would, in
the well known phrase of Richard John Neuhaus, create a "naked public
86. Id. at 303.
87. Id. at 305; see also id. at 307-12 (statement of the Most Rev. Joseph L. Bernardin, General
Secretary, United States Catholic Conference).
88. See, e.g., Influencing Legislation by Public Charities, Hearing Before the House Ways and
Means Committee, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 68 (1974) (statement of James E. Woods, Jr. on behalf
of the Baptist Joint Committee on Public Affairs); id. at 75-76 (statement of the Lutheran Coun-
cil in the U.S.A.); id. at 81-82 (statement on Behalf of the National Council of Churches of
Christ in the U.S.A.); id. at 90 (statement of the United States Catholic Conference).
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square." Echoing Will Herberg,"9 Neuhaus notes that this kind of separation
is an impossible project, and is undesirable even if it were possible:
[T]he public square cannot and does not remain naked. When particularist
religious values and the institutions that bear them are excluded, the ines-
capable need to make public moral judgments will result in an elite con-
struction of a normative morality from sources and principles not democrati-
cally recognized by the society.
The truly naked public square is at best a transitional phenomenon. It is a
vacuum begging to be filled. When the democratically affirmed institutions
that generate and transmit values are excluded, the vacuum will be filled by
the agent left in control of the public square, the state. In this manner, a
perverse notion of the disestablishment of religion leads to the establishment
of the state as church.90
Whether or not one accepts all the turns in Neuhaus's argument,91 it seems
clear that the history of American politics has not been one in which social
ethics have been totally secularized, or one in which religion has played no
role. To the contrary, for many religious bodies political speech has been a
form of religious ministry that is central to their religious convictions.
After years of practical experience dealing with the restraints placed by the
tax code on the activities of religious bodies relating to politics, two attorneys
in the Office of General Counsel of the United States Catholic Conference
concluded that these restraints "seriously impair the practical ability of [ex-
empt religious] organizations to participate in the public debate on socio-moral
issues of vital concern to the nation's welfare" and have "an intimidating ad-
verse effect upon the proper pastoral missions" of these organizations.92 They
argue:
Whatever might be the legitimate interest of government in denying a pub-
lic subsidy to political activity (however that phrase is defined), it cannot
justify the Draconian thrust of a total legal mechanism which, at the in-
stance of the government or third-party litigants, threatens the financial sup-
port of churches and others on the claim that public debate and voter educa-
tion have crossed a murky regulatory line and been transformed into support
of, or opposition to, a political candidate.9"
This critical view of the existing legal arrangements is not unique to these
89. See, e.g., FROM MARXISM TO JUDAISM: COLLECTED ESSAYS OF WILL HERBERG (D. Dalin,
ed. 1989).
90. R. NEUHAUS, supra note 11, at 86.
91. For the dismissive view that Neuhaus's position is a "neo-conservative [sic] myth," see J.
CASTELLI, A PLEA FOR COMMON SENSE: RESOLVING THE CLASH BETWEEN RELIGION AND POLIT-
ics 1 (1988). A more nuanced critique of Neuhaus' neoconservative tendencies is found in P.
WOGAMAN, supra note 57, at 72-74, 76, 78, 82, 85. See also Skillen, Review, 8 J.L. & RELIG.
- (1990).
92. Caron & Dessingue, IRC § 501 (c)(3): Practical and Constitutional Implications of "Politi-
cal" Activity Restrictions, 2 J.L. & POLITICS 169, 199 (1985).
93. Id.
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two attorneys. For example, the 1988 policy statement of the General Assem-
bly of the Presbyterian Church cited above also contains nine conclusions that
are relevant to the theme of this article:
The state may not use its power to tax or to exempt from taxation, to
restrict, or place conditions on the exercise of religion.
The state may not tax the central exercise of religion or property essential
to the core functions of religion. We hold that the application of the restric-
tions in section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code to the speech of the
church and its leaders are an unconstitutional limitation on a central exer-
cise of religion ....
The corporate entities and individual members of the Presbyterian
Church (U.S.A.) are obliged by the religious faith and order they profess to
participate in public life and become involved in the realm of politics.
Pastors and officials of the church, as well as lay members, have the right
and responsibility to stand for and hold public office when they feel called to
do so.
The "free exercise of religion" must be understood to include and protect
the right to practice faith in public and private as well as the right to believe
and thus to include participation in public affairs by the individuals and
church bodies for which such participation is an element of faith.
As part of the church participation in public life, governing bodies of the
Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) at every level should speak out on public and
political issues, taking care to articulate the moral and ethical implications
of public policies and practices.
We recognize that speaking out on issues will sometimes constitute im-
plicit support or opposition to particular candidates or parties, where policy
and platform differences are clearly drawn. Since such differences are the
vital core of the political process, church participation should not be cur-
tailed on that account; but we believe that it is generally unwise and impru-
dent for the church explicitly to support or oppose specific candidates, ex-
cept in unusual circumstances.
We reject and oppose any attempts on the part of the church to exercise
political authority or to use the political process to achieve governmental
sponsorship of worship or religious practice.
We oppose attempts by government to limit or deny religious participa-
tion in public life by statute or regulation, including Internal Revenue Ser-
vice regulations on the amount or percentage of money used to influence
legislation, and prohibition of church intervention in political campaigns.94
The remainder of this Article explores whether the conclusions of the two
church lawyers and the Presbyterian statement cited above are sound. Before
reaching a conclusion on these issues, it is necessary to unravel the various
ways in which the federal government has attempted to regulate the political
activities of exempt religious organizations. The next three sections of this Ar-
ticle correspond to the tripartite separation of powers: legislative, executive,
94. GOD ALONE is LORD OF THE CONSCIENCE, supra note 3, at 38, 52. These conclusions,
called "affirmations" in the policy document, are discussed at pages 32-38, 47-51 of the document.
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and judicial.
IV. THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF CONGRESSIONAL RESTRAINTS ON THE
POLITICAL SPEECH OF RELIGIOUS BODIES
Under current tax policy, the government imposes restraints on activities of
religious organizations relating to politics, principally on the view that it may
do so because it refrains from collecting a portion of the income that is con-
tributed to these organizations for exempt religious purposes.0 5 There are two
principal restraints on religious bodies triggered by virtue of their tax-exempt
status. Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code imposes a restriction
on substantial activities to influence legislation and on the use of substantial
amounts of income in attempts to influence legislation,"9 and it imposes an
absolute ban on efforts to influence the outcome of campaigns for elective
office.
9 7
One obvious place to turn for guidance in construing the meaning of a stat-
ute is its legislative history. The 1934 restraints on lobbying were not preceded
by hearings in the Senate Finance Committee. The sponsor of the floor
amendment, Senator Pat Harrison, asserted that the intent of the proposal was
simply to exclude from exempt status sham organizations that were merely a
"front" for lobbying for private interests; he had no desire to affect the legisla-
tive activities of any of the "worthy institutions. "98
Apparently the Senator was irked by the activities of the National Economy
League."' Because the constitutional prohibition against a bill of attainder' 00
meant that the Senator could not single out this group for different treatment
under the law, the inhibition had to be passed out more generally. It was on
this sort of "in for a penny, in for a pound" reasoning that the activities of
religious organizations "attempting to influence legislation" became subject to
federal regulation. There is no evidence in the legislative history that Congress
thought that any religious organizations were engaged in chicanery of the sort
95. This statement of the problem concedes that income generated by an exempt organization
from sources unrelated to its exempt purposes is taxable. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 511-513; J. GALLO-
WAY, THE UNRELATED BUSINESS INCOME TAX (1982). Indeed, it is significant to note that the
major religious bodies, through the National Council of Churches and the United States Catholic
Conference, actively sought, during the deliberations on the Tax Reform Act of 1969, to have
such income taxed. See Gaffney, Governmental Definition of Religion: The Rise and Fall of the
IRS Regulations on an "Integrated Auxiliary of a Church," in ECUMENICAL PERSPECTIVES ON
CHURCH AND STATE 73-110 (J. Wood, Jr., ed. 1988).
96. See, e.g., Comment, Church Lobbying: The Legitimacy of the Controls, 16 Hous. L. REV.
480 (1979).
97. See, e.g., IRS EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS HANDBOOK § 3(10)1 (IRM 7751); Treas. Reg. §
1.501 (c)(3)-l(c)(3)(iii). See generally Caron & Dessingue, I.R.C. § 501(c)(3): Practical and Con-
stitutional Implications of "Political" Activity Restrictions, 2 J.L. & POLITICS 169 (1985). See
also id. at 180 n.40, 181 n.41, 183 n.54.
98. 78 CONG. REC. 5959 (1934).
99. See B. HOPKINS, THE LAW OF TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS 265 (5th ed. 1987).
100. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9.
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that had triggered the amendment. Nevertheless, they were included among
the exempt organizations whose political freedoms were restricted under this
provision of the tax code.
In the discussion of the floor amendment, a member of the Senate Finance
Committee, Senator David Reed, stated that the drafters of the legislation
were given "an impossible task" and that the language they proposed went
"much further than the committee intended to go," namely, to withdraw the
deductibility of contributions "made to advance the personal interest of the
giver of the money." 10' 1
In the case of the 1954 amendment imposing restraints on involvement in
political campaigns, there was no report by either of the congressional commit-
tees with expertise in tax matters recommending the legislation. Within a few
seconds, or-if one is a slow reader-a few minutes, one can master all there
is to know about the legislative history of this second significant conditional
restraint on the political freedom of exempt organizations. What is to be
known is that there is virtually nothing to be known from this standard source
for statutory construction. Again, what is to be gleaned from the legislative
history comes from the sparse record of the discussions of an amendment sub-
mitted on the floor of the Senate by Senator Lyndon Johnson, who was evi-
dently piqued by the political involvement of an exempt family foundation that
had the temerity to support one of Senator Johnson's opponents.' 2 The voice
vote on Senator Johnson's amendment was unrecorded. Again, although there
is no evidence in the legislative history that Congress thought that religious
organizations were engaged in the kind of behavior that Congress sought to
control, they were nevertheless included within the regulation that imposed a
flat ban on electioneering by exempt organizations.
V. CONSTRAINTS IMPOSED BY THE ADMINISTRATIVE RULE-MAKING
PROCESS ON RELIGIOUS ACTIVITIES RELATING TO POLITICS
The biggest practical difficulty for the churches arises from the Internal
Revenue Service's bizarre interpretations of a vague statute. The principal
function of the Service is to collect revenue for the operation of the various
programs of the government. Since those who are employed within the Service
are not chosen because of their practical experience in political campaigns, it
should be no surprise that the rules that the IRS has written in this area of the
law have not reflected the realities of political life in America very well. Fur-
thermore, tax collectors are not chosen to engage in this task because of any
sophisticated understanding of the historical and theological concerns dis-
cussed earlier in this Article. Perhaps this is why the rules they write about
exempt religious organizations seem so insensitive to the delicacy of religious
freedom in this country.
101. 78 CONG. REC. 5861 (1934).
102. See B. HOPKINS, supra note 99, at 281.
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A. Lobbying Regulations
The IRS does not take the absolutist position that any attempt to influence
legislation requires revocation of exempt status. Even the statute itself calls for
more flexibility than that, since it prohibits only "substantial" attempts to in-
fluence legislation.103 I will return to the problem of the vagueness of this stan-
dard later. For now, it is important to stress that some contacts between Con-
gress and religious leaders clearly create no problem for the tax-exempt status
of their organizations.
B. Electioneering Regulations
Unlike the regulations that restrict lobbying to an "insubstantial" amount,
however that term is to be understood, the regulations governing electioneering
activities of religious organizations constitute a total and virtually absolute ban
on these activities. Vagueness still abounds as to the crucial threshold question
of what is meant by the term "electioneering." As to how much election-
eering-however it is defined-an exempt organization may engage in, vague-
ness is replaced by certainty, and with a vengeance. A more total and absolute
ban on political activity-generally thought to be at the heart of first amend-
ment protections-cannot be imagined.
Some regulation of political activity has been deemed constitutional."" Per-
haps because the Federal Election Commission is staffed with personnel more
familiar with the realities of political campaigns, the rules they promulgate on
this matter seem like skillful surgery with a scalpel compared to the meat-ax
approach of numerous IRS regulations written by tax collectors.10 5 For exam-
ple, the Federal Election Campaign Act ("FECA") bans corporate expendi-
tures in federal campaigns.106 The courts, however, have construed FECA to
be limited to messages that expressly advocate support for or opposition to
clearly identified candidates. 10 7 By contrast, as recently as 1989, the National
103. I.R.C. § 501(c).
104. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (invalidating some provisions of the post-
Watergate legislation reforming federal election campaigns, and sustaining other provisions of the
same statute).
105. In the view of the 1988 Presbyterian statement:
The Internal Revenue Service does not seem to be able to distinguish between discus-
sion of issues and candidates, on the one hand, and intervention in campaigns on
behalf of specific candidates on the other, though the Supreme Court emphasized the
necessity of this distinction in interpreting laws dealing with political expression.
GOD ALONE is LORD OF THE CONSCIENCE, supra note 3, at 49-50 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S. 1 (1976)).
106. 2 U.S.C. § 441b (1988).
107. "[A corporate] expenditure must constitute 'express advocacy' in order to be subject to the
prohibition of § 441b." Federal Election Comm'n v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479
U.S. 238, 249 (1986) ("MCFL"). The MCFL Court adopted- this narrowing construction to avoid
potential overbreadth, consistent with the Court's construction of other provisions of the FECA in
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). "[Clommunications containing express words of advocacy of
election or defeat, such as 'vote for,' 'elect,' 'support,' 'cast your ballot for,' 'Smith for Congress,'
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Office of the IRS rejected the view that the "express advocacy" standard ap-
plies to tax-exempt organizations. In the view of the Service, churches might
forfeit exempt status by fostering discussion of war and peace issues during a
presidential election campaign without identifying any candidate by name.'08
Perhaps in response to pressure from some members of Congress who do not
care much for religiously-grounded objections to their performance in public
office, 109 the IRS got into the habit of pronouncing rules during campaign
years that have been increasingly restrictive of the activities of exempt organi-
zations in politics. 10 For example, in 1976 the IRS suggested that it was a
prohibited campaign activity for an exempt organization to ask candidates for
public office to endorse a code of campaign ethics, although the organization
had not endorsed any candidate or even published the response to its request.
Several of these administrative regulations, moreover, are constitutionally vul-
nerable because they severely inhibit voter education efforts by exempt organi-
zations on topics of concern to the organization. Illustrative of the problems
these rulings create for religious organizations is a Revenue Ruling issued in
1978, the chief virtue of which is that it reversed an even more Draconian
ruling that the Service had issued only weeks before."' Revenue Ruling 78-
248 bans voter education efforts by exempt organizations, which compile and
publish voting records of all members of Congress, if the votes reported are
not on a wide range of topics but are limited to selected issues of interest to
the organization, or if there is even an implied indication of the organization's
approval or disapproval of the voting records, or so much as an editorial com-
ment offered by the organization." 2
'vote against,' 'defeat,' [or] 'reject[]' " are therefore prohibited by § 441b. Buckley, 424 U.S. at
44 n.52; 11 C.F.R. § 109.1(b)(2) (1989).
108. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 8936002 (May 24, 1989). Although troubled by the timing and potential
impact of television advertisements on the war/peace theme during a two-week period around the
foreign policy debate on October 21, 1984 between President Ronald Reagan and Presidential
candidate Walter Mondale, the Service "reluctantly" concluded that the advertisements might be
viewed as "nonpartisan" and hence did not constitute prohibited electioneering activity.
109. For a discussion of religion in recent political campaigns, see J. CASTELLI, supra note 91;
R. McBRIEN, supra note 66; THE POLITICAL ROLE OF RELIGION IN THE UNITED STATES, supra
note 66.
110. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 64-195, 1964-2 C.B. 138; Rev. Rul. 66-258, 1966-2 C.B. 213; Rev.
Rul. 70-49, 1970-1 C.B. 127; Rev. Rul. 70-449, 1970-2 C.B. 111; Rev. Rul. 78-160, 1978-1 C.B.
153, revised by Rev. Rul. 78-248, 1978-1 C.B. 1545; Rev. Rul. 80-282, 1980-2 C.B. 178.
11I. Rev. Rul. 78-160, 1978-1 C.B. 153 (announcing that an organization does not qualify for
exempt status if it publishes in a newsletter responses to a questionnaire sent to candidates for
public office in an upcoming election), rev'd, Rev. Rul. 78-284, 1978-1 C.B. 154.
112. Rev. Rul. 78-248, 1978-1 C.B. 154. This Revenue Ruling set forth four hypothetical fact
situations, two of which were viewed as protected or at least permissible activity, and two of which
were viewed as violating the prohibition in § 501(c)(3) on political activity. To facilitate an appre-
ciation of the tortured and turgid prose that religious organizations must attempt to make sense of
when they decide about religious activities relating to politics, I include here the entire text of this
Revenue Ruling:
Situation I: Organization A has been recognized as exempt under section 501(c)(3)
of the Code by the Internal Revenue Service. As one of its activities, the organization
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It is by no means clear why the Sierra Club, for example, should not be able
to engage in voter education on environmental matters without having to take
on a host of other matters that may be of lesser moment to that organization.
And why should the NAACP Education and Legal Defense Fund be told that
it will lose its exempt status if it dares to report the votes of members of
Congress exclusively on civil rights matters (never mind that it might have
something to say about those matters in an editorial)? Several scholars have
criticized the truncated version of the second amendment that the National
Rifle Association usually trumpets (stressing the "right of the people to keep
and bear arms" and ignoring the conditional clause referring to the purpose of
annually prepares and makes generally available to the public a compilation of voting
records of all Members of Congress on major legislative issues involving a wide range
of subjects. The publication contains no editorial opinion, and its contents and struc-
ture do not imply approval or disapproval of any members or their voting records.
The "voter education" activity of Organization A is not prohibited political activity
within the meaning of section 501(c)(3) of the Code.
Situation 2: Organization B has been recognized as exempt under section 501(c)(3)
of the Code by the Internal Revenue Service. As one of its activities in election years,
it sends a questionnaire to all candidates for governor in State M. The questionnaire
solicits a brief statement of each candidate's position on a wide variety of issues. All
responses are published in a voters guide that it makes generally available to the
public. The issues covered are selected by the organization solely on the basis of their
importance and interest to the electorate as a whole. Neither the questionnaire nor
the voters guide, in content or structure, evidences a bias or preference with respect to
the views of any candidate or group of candidates.
The "voter education" activity of Organization B is not prohibited political activity
within the meaning of section 501(c)(3) of the Code.
Situation 3: Organization C has been recognized as exempt under section 501(c)(3)
of the Code by the Internal Revenue Service. Organization C undertakes a "voter
education" activity patterned after that of Organization B in Situation 2. It sends a
questionnaire to candidates for major public offices and uses the responses to prepare
a voters guide which is distributed during an election campaign. Some questions evi-
dence a bias on certain issues. By using a questionnaire structured in this way, Organ-
ization C is participating in a political campaign in contravention of the provisions of
section 501(c)(3) and is disqualified as exempt under that section.
Situation 4: Organization D has been recognized as exempt under section 501(c)(3)
of the Code. It is primarily concerned with land conservation matters. The organiza-
tion publishes a voters guide for its members and others concerned with land conser-
vation issues. The guide is intended as a compilation of incumbents' voting records on
selected land conservation issues of importance to the organization and is factual in
nature. It contains no express statements in support of or in opposition to any candi-
date. The guide is widely distributed among the electorate during an election
campaign.
While the guide may provide the voting public with useful information, its empha-
sis on one area of concern indicates that its purpose is not nonpartisan voter
education.
By concentrating on a narrow range of issues in the voters guide and widely distrib-
uting it among the electorate during an election campaign, Organization D is partici-
pating in a political campaign in contravention of the provisions of section 501(c)(3)
and is disqualified as exempt under that section.
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the provision: "a well ordered militia"), but one dreads to think of the NRA
being required by the IRS to expand its political agenda to arms control in the
post-Cold War era.
In 1980, the Service modified its 1978 ruling slightly, but by no means re-
moved all of its offensive restrictions. Absent any electioneering activity, Reve-
nue Ruling 80-282 allows the publication of congressional voting records on
selected issues with an indication of whether those votes correspond to the
organization's views.118 That sounds like progress, until one looks at the crite-
ria which the IRS considered to demonstrate the absence of prohibited elec-
tioneering activity:
(1) the voting records of all incumbents will be presented, (2) candidates for
reelection will not be identified, (3) no comment will be made on an individ-
ual's overall qualifications for public office, (4) no statements expressly or
impliedly endorsing or rejecting any incumbent as a candidate for public
office will be offered, (5) no comparison of incumbents with other candidates
will be made, (6) the organization will point out the inherent limitations of
judging the qualifications of an incumbent on the basis of certain selected
votes, by stating the need to consider such unrecorded matters as perform-
ance on subcommittees and constituent service, (7) the organization will not
widely distribute its compilation of incumbents' voting records, (8) the pub-
lication will be distributed to the organization's normal readership (who
number only a few thousand nationwide), and (9) no attempt will be made
to target the publication toward particular areas in which elections are oc-
curring nor to time the publication to coincide with an election campaign. '"
In short, the IRS will only tolerate politically oriented religious speech that is
feeble and ineffective.
The policy judgments of the IRS embodied in the 1978 and the 1980 Reve-
nue Rulings raise grave constitutional doubt, yet churches and other exempt
organizations are expected to accept them supinely. Most churches, if not all,
do comply with these tax regulations because the stakes-forfeiture of exempt
status-are so high that only the most hearty dare contravene rules that make
little sense on their face.
One is led to wonder how the abolitionists would have coped with the con-
straints on free speech that section 501(c)(3) of the tax code and various rul-
ings by the IRS now impose on religious bodies. As I suggested earlier in this
Article, it seems clear that the virtually single-minded nature of their moral
repugnance to slavery would have brought them into conflict with the tax
code, for they were prepared to disobey many federal statutes that reinforced
the slavery regime. On the strength of this example, one should not exaggerate
the ability of the government to control American politics. But the bureau-
cratic stifling of critical religious opposition to a variety of governmental poli-
cies is a real danger in an era of deregulation of for-profit corporations and
113. Rev. Rul. 80-282, 1980-2 C.B. 178.
114. B. HOPKINS, supra note 99, at 285-86.
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increasing regulation of not-for-profit corporations. As the Presbyterian State-
ment put it, "If government were free to grant tax or withhold exemptions as
different churches pleased or displeased it, government could control all but
the most resolute of the churches.' 15 This result-subjecting the churches to
the control of the government-seems at the very least to be antithetical to the
spirit of the first amendment, which needs "breathing space" in order to
flourish."'
VI. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATIONS
A. General Principles Relating to the Civil Liberties of Religious Groups
Whether or not the IRS has construed the intent of Congress correctly, the
restraints imposed by Congress or the Executive on the activities of religious
bodies touching upon politics must, in any event, conform to constitutional
standards. The evaluation of this issue is often clouded by one's perception of a
particular group. Thus many liberals seem stuck with stereotypical images of
evangelical Christians, lumping Pat Robertson's 700 Club with Ron Sider's
Evangelicals for Social Action. And many conservatives fail to make very sub-
tle distinctions about the perspectives of their ideological adversaries, lumping
together as "liberal" all the "mainline" Protestant denominations that have
articulated positions on controversial public policy matters. Assuming that it is
desirable and possible to move beyond such inaccurate generalizations, I wish
to emphasize that no matter what perception one has of a political opponent,
the genius of liberal democracy is that speech should be corrected by more
speech. When we allow the government to restrict the speech of an adversary,
we diminish our own political freedom, for we thereby validate the ability of
the government to regulate and control that which is essential to the survival
of a democracy, namely, "uninhibited, robust, and wide open" advocacy of
conflicting opinions."'
No decision of the Supreme Court has squarely decided the constitutionality
of the statutory and administrative regulation of the religious activities of
churches that touch on political realities." 8 Hence, any discussion of this
theme must proceed by analyzing the basic principles of free speech and of
religious freedom within the context of government benefits and the withhold-
ing of benefits.
Because presenting one's views on matters of public concern to legislators,
otherwise known as lobbying, is activity that is clearly protected under the
115. GOD ALONE is LORD OF THE CONSCIENCE, supra note 3, at 34.
116. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
117. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
118. It would be a lot easier to refer to the subject matter of this Article as the "political
activity" of religious organizations. To do so, however would misunderstand the profoundly reli-
gious character and motivation of this activity. For this very reason, religious organizations should
avoid the tendency to collapse their message into language that is indistinguishable from that of
purely partisan politics.
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petition clause of the first amendment,11 9 there can be no serious doubt that
the government may not prohibit the lobbying efforts of religious organiza-
tions. Similarly, since the "central meaning" of the first amendment is that
political speech is so important to the democracy that it deserves special pro-
tection under the free speech and free press clauses, there can likewise be no
serious doubt that a statute that actually forbade political campaign activity
by a religious community would be unconstitutional.
These conclusions seem certain from the following precedents. In New York
Times v. Sullivan,'2" Justice Brennan wrote that the law of libel had to be
modified to accommodate the central meaning of the first amendment: "the
profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues
should be uninhibited, robust and wide-open, and that it may well include ve-
hement, caustic and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attack on government and
public officials .... " In McDaniel v. Paty,"2 the Court invalidated a provi-
sion in the Tennessee Constitution that prohibited members of the clergy from
running for public office. Concurring in McDaniel, Justice Brennan observed,
"religious ideas, no less than any other, may be the subject of debate which is
uninhibited, robust, and wide open . . . . [T]hat public debate of religious
ideas, like any other, may arouse emotion, may incite, may foment religious
divisiveness and strife, does not rob it of constitutional protection."' 2 3 As Jus-
tice Powell explained a few days later in First National Bank of Boston v.
Bellotti,124 it is not the source of the speech, but the kind of speech that gives
rise to special constitutional concern. The kind of speech that is in fact
thought more worthy of protection under the free speech clause is political
speech, which Justice Powell described as "the type of speech indispensable to
decision making in a democracy.' 28 Powell noted that "the inherent worth of
the speech in terms of its capacity for informing the public does not depend on
the identity of its source .... In the realm of protected speech, the legislature
is constitutionally disqualified from dictating the subjects about which persons
may speak and the speakers who may address a public issue. '1 26
In the face of these seemingly solid precedents, why is it impossible to pre-
dict with confidence that the Supreme Court would find the restraints on the
activities of religious organizations relating to politics to be unconstitutional?
The problem of the constitutionality of section 501(c)(3), and the regulations
issued under that statute, is much more subtle than whether the government is
119. See, e.g., Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127
(1961).
120. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
121. Id. at 270.
122. 435 U.S. 618 (1978).
123. Id. at 640 (Brennan, J., concurring) (citing New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,
270 (1964)).
124. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
125. Id. at 777.
126. Id. at 777, 784-88.
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prohibiting protected activity. 127 For one thing, the statute and regulations
have to do with taxing and refraining from taxing, so the more precise issue is
whether Congress may condition the grant of tax-exempt status upon the ap-
parent surrender of civil liberties.12
B. Tax Exemption as a Subsidy
In my view, the major reason why these restrictions in the tax code are
thought permissible in the prevailing wisdom, indeed hardly ever subjected to
serious constitutional analysis,12 9 is that an exemption from taxation is com-
monly regarded by economists and budget planners not as merely leaving an
exempt organization alone, but as the functional equivalent of a cash subsidy
from the federal treasury to the exempt organization. 10 Moreover, if tax ex-
emption is regarded as a matter of governmental grace, then the government
may condition this benefit on a waiver of constitutional rights. Although the
concept of tax expenditures is itself a matter worthy of full-length considera-
tion, some discussion of the understanding of tax benefits as subsidies is neces-
sary here because it is the underlying premise of the whole regulatory appara-
tus that I have described in this Article.
Once granted, the premise that exemption is a subsidy leads to the conclu-
127. Precisely because the statute and regulations do not expressly prohibit such activity, some
literalists would insist that no free exercise clause issue is presented at all, since that provision
states that "Congress shall make no law prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]." U.S. CONST.
amend. I (emphasis added).
128. For a carefully honed and skillfully argued discussion of whether exempt organizations
should be allowed to participate in the formulation of public policy, see Chisolm, Exempt Organi-
zation Advocacy: Matching the Rules to the Rationales, 63 IND. L.J. 201 (1987). In this article
Professor Chisolm notes that the rules limiting system-change advocacy have been devised in
"patchwork fashion ... with no attempt to relate the pieces to a common theoretical foundation."
Id. at 299. The redrawing of the tax rules that she advocates would reflect more accurately the
underlying rationales of the rules, screen out undesired effects, and limit administrative discretion
so that the rules would apply evenhandedly. Professor Chisolm has also offered a thorough and
judicious treatment of the problems posed by the restraints on political activity by exempt organi-
zations. See Chisolm, Politics and Charity: A Proposal for Peaceful Coexistence, 58 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 308 (1990); Chisolm, Sinking the Think Tanks Upstream: The Use and Misuse of Tax
Exemption Law to Address the Use and Misuse of Tax-Exempt Organizations by Politicians, 51
U. PITT. L. REV. 577 (1990); Chisolm & Young, Introduction, Symposium: What is Charity?
Implications for Law and Policy, 39 CASE W. RES. 653 (1989).
129. The buzzword for this kind of analysis is "strict scrutiny." Whether a reviewing court
employs this standard of review or the less strict standard of rationality is, of course, itself a
constitutional choice often determined by peeking at the merits of the policy under review. For a
valiant attempt to make sense of these standards, see Gunther, Foreword. In Search of Evolving
Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REV. 1
(1972).
130. For a thorough analysis of this problem as it relates to grants under the spending power,
see Rosenthal, Conditional Federal Spending and the Constitution, 39 STAN. L. REV. 1103
(1987). See also Epstein, The Supreme Court, 1987 Term-Foreword. Unconstitutional Condi-
tions, State Power, and the Limits of Consent, 102 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1988); Sullivan, Unconstitu-
tional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413 (1989); Unconstitutional Conditions Symposium, 26
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 175 (1989).
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sion that religious organizations are free to engage in political speech if they
choose to do so, but they must then forego the considerable benefit of tax-
exempt status. This was the view adopted by the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Tenth Circuit in Christian Echoes National Ministry, Inc. v.
United States.'3' The Christian Echoes court suggested that the rationale for
such a view was that the federal treasury should not subsidize attempts to
influence legislation or to affect a political campaign. 3
This rationale, however, is seriously undercut by several other provisions in
the tax code that were clearly designed to provide a tax benefit for various
political activities. For example, I.R.C. § 527 exempts political action commit-
tees from income tax on funds used to influence the election of candidates for
public office, and until the Tax Reform Act of 1986, I.R.C. § 41 extended a
tax credit for contributions to candidates for public office.
Nevertheless, under the Christian Echoes rationale, religious organizations
are put to the hard choice of speaking out on political issues and paying taxes,
or remaining silent and retaining their tax-exempt status. On this view of the
law, they have no constitutional right to free speech and tax exemption at the
same time. The next section of this Article analyzes this view under the doc-
trine of unconstitutional conditions. For now, it is enough to note that the
Supreme Court did not review the Christian Echoes decision, so it did not set
a nationally binding precedent. 133
Neither as a matter of religious principle nor as a requirement of constitu-
tional law may religious bodies claim entitlement to the best of all possible tax
worlds. There are several important reasons, however, why the major premise
adopted in Christian Echoes should not be readily granted.
First, the subsidization theory proves too much. The government may not, of
course, purchase one's constitutional rights by extending a grant under the
spending power."3 For example, it may not condition receipt of food stamps
on forfeiture of membership in the political party of one's choice. In the lead-
ing decision directly relating this teaching to tax benefits, Speiser v. Ran-
dall, '3 the Court stated:
It is settled that speech can be effectively limited by exercise of the taxing
power .... To deny an exemption to claimants who engage in certain forms
of speech is in effect to penalize them for such speech. Its deterrent effect is
the same as if the State were to fine them for this speech."3
As First Unitarian Church v. County of Los Angeles3 7 (a companion case to
131. 470 F.2d 849 (10th Cir. 1972).
132. Id. at 854.
133. Christian Echoes Nat'l Ministry, Inc. v. United States, 470 F.2d 849 (10th Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 864 (1973).
134. See, e.g., Garvey, The Powers and the Duties of Government, 26 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 209
(1989) (symposium issue: unconstitutional conditions).
135. 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
136. Id. at 518.
137. 357 U.S. 545 (1958).
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Speiser) indicates, the same reasoning applies to religious organizations as to
individuals.
Second, although the view of income tax exemption as a subsidy purports to
be grounded in the recent case of Regan v. Taxation With Representation
("TWR"), 3 8 it ignores other precedential authority. In Walz v. Tax Commis-
sion, the Supreme Court sustained tax exemption for property used exclusively
for religious worship, and expressly repudiated the view that exemption was an
impermissible subsidy."3 9
Granting tax exemptions to churches necessarily operates to afford an indi-
rect economic benefit ... [but] the grant of a tax exemption is not sponsor-
ship since the government does not transfer part of its revenue to churches
but simply abstains from demanding that the church support the state. No
one has ever suggested that tax exemption has converted libraries, art gal-
leries, or hospitals into arms of the state or employees "on the public
payroll.""'
It is highly significant, moreover, that the Walz Court likewise expressly ad-
verted to the reality that "[a]dherents of particular faiths and individual
churches frequently take strong positions on public issues including ... vigor-
ous advocacy of legal or constitutional positions. Of course, churches as much
as secular bodies and private citizens have that right."'"
Third, the reliance upon the TWR case is itself misplaced. It is true that
thirteen years after Walz, the Court in TWR treated tax-exempt status as
though it were a subsidy.' 2 In this respect, the Court inched toward the posi-
tion espoused by the Christian Echoes court. TWR, however, did not involve a
religious body attempting to communicate its religious message on matters of
public concern, and the Court even cited Walz without questioning its prece-
dential value. 4
138. 461 U.S. 540 (1983).
139. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
140. Id. at 674-75.
141. Id. at 670.
142. Regan v. Taxation With Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 544 (1983).
143. Id. at 544 n.5. The Court most recently addressed the meaning of Walz in Texas Monthly,
Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 109 S. Ct. 890 (1989). The case produced four separate opinions. A
plurality opinion authored by Justice Brennan struck down a tax exemption for religious publica-
tions as too narrow to pass muster under the no-establishment clause. Id. at 899. The plurality
interpreted the property tax exemption in Walz as permissible because it included many other
nonprofit groups which contributed to intellectual pluralism in the community. Id. at 898-99 (plu-
rality opinion).
Justice Scalia wrote a dissent arguing that the plurality opinion relied on Justice Brennan's
concurrence in Walz, rather than the majority opinion in Watz. Id. at 909-12 (Scalia, J., dissent-
ing). The dissenters contended that a tax exemption for religious publications was a permissible
accommodation of religion. Id. at 912 ("The [Walz] Court did not approve an exemption for
charities that happened to benefit religion; it approved an exemption for religion as an exemption
for religion." (emphasis in original)).
Justice Blackmun, joined by Justice O'Connor, concurred in the judgment of the plurality. This
concurrence did not join the debate over the meaning of Watz. Instead, these two Justices sug-
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There is another reason why TWR is not directly controlling on the validity
of restraints on the activities of religious organizations relating to politics.
With a nod to Speiser v. Randall, the TWR Court agreed that "the govern-
ment may not deny a benefit to a person because he exercises a constitutional
right. 1 4 4 In other words, the Court agreed that the government may not pe-
nalize a taxpayer's exercise of free speech rights. Looking at the economic
impact of the deductibility of contributions to an exempt organization for the
purpose of influencing legislation, the Court held that the rules governing a
section 501(c)(3) organization are not an invalid penalty, but merely the de-
nial of a subsidy. The Court reached this result because I.R.C. § 501 contains
a "saving" feature, namely, section 501(c)(4). Under this provision, TWR
could organize a 501(c)(4) affiliate, completely under its control, to carry on
its political activities. Under this arrangement, the section 501(c)(3) entity
remains exempt from taxation of its income, but may not engage in lobbying
or electioneering. The section 501(c)(4) entity is also tax-exempt and is free to
engage in political activities, but contributions to a section 501(c)(4) entity are
not deductible from the gross income of the contributor/taxpayer.
Without claiming that there is a constitutional right to the deductibility of
contributions to religious organizations, I simply note that this "saving fea-
ture" of section 501(c)(4) is inapplicable to religious organizations. As I sug-
gested above, when religious organizations "attempt to influence legislation,"
they are typically engaging in religious activity, speaking to the moral aspects
of political issues. To quote again from the Presbyterian statement cited
above:
Such witness flows directly from fundamental faith and is integral to its free
exercise. It is essential to the church's identity and mission, and to the moral
authority of its pronouncements, that it speak as "church" through its reli-
gious structures and leaders. No church can be restricted to speaking on
political issues solely through functionaries employed by a political affiliate
without violating its faith and calling. Any attempt to segregate a church's
political speech from its moral and religious speech fundamentally misun-
derstands the nature of church speech on political issues .... [Slpeaking on
the moral implications of political issues is a core religious function, pro-
tected by the free exercise clause .... 145
gested that the tax exemption violated the no-establishment clause because it did not apply to
atheistic publications. Id. at 907 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice White con-
curred in the judgment, deciding that the tax exemption is a content-based discrimination that
violates the press clause of the first amendment. Id. at 905.
Even though Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens fundamentally disagreed with Justices
Scalia and Kennedy, and Chief Justice Rehnquist, over the correct interpretation of Walz, the
Texas Monthly case supports tax exemptions for churches in two ways. First, the opinion demon-
strates that Walz remains good law. Second, even the plurality's reading of Walz supports a tax
exemption for churches because I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) is far more analogous to the broad exemption
for nonprofit groups upheld in Walz than the narrow exemption struck down in Texas Monthly.
144. See Regan v. Taxation With Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 545 (1983).
145. GoD ALONE IS LORD OF THE CONSCIENCE, supra note 3, at 36.
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In any event, section 501 (c)(4) is of no practical use to a preacher who cannot
be required to announce at the beginning of a sermon whether he is speaking
for a 501(c)(3) church. or a 501(c)(4) clone, let alone to switch birettas or
yarmulkes in the midst of such a sermon.
Fourth, the tax expenditure theory should not be applied to religious bodies
for the very reason that, under the no-establishment clause, religion is not nor-
mally a legitimate function of governmental planning or financial support." 6
Fifth, the legislative history of the original income tax legislation supports
the conclusion that the intent of Congress was simply to exclude the income of
religious and charitable organizations from the base of taxable income." 7
C. Free Exercise Analysis
It is well settled that religious bodies are afforded additional constitutional
protection precisely because of their religious character. The protection of the
free exercise clause may be invoked only by persons or groups whose sincerely
held religious tenets are burdened by governmental action." 8 In Thomas v.
Review Board,"" the Court reemphasized its teaching on impermissible bur-
dens on the free exercise of religion:
Where the state conditions receipt of an important benefit upon conduct
proscribed by a religious faith, or where it denies such a benefit because of
conduct mandated by religious belief, thereby putting substantial pressure
on an adherent to modify his behavior and to violate his belief, a burden
upon religion exists. While the compulsion may be indirect, the infringement
upon free exercise is nonetheless substantial.'8 0
The use of the taxing power to inhibit the freedom of religious organizations
to announce their message on public policy matters creates just such a burden
for many, if not most, religious bodies. For example, the congressional testi-
mony cited above' 5 ' clearly reflects a widespread conviction that participation
by religious organizations in legislative matters is required as a matter of reli-
gious faith and conviction. This testimony thus demonstrates conclusively that,
for many religious bodies, what looks like "political speech" to outsiders is a
form of religious ministry for members of the religious body. Hence, a signifi-
cant burden on this ministry is tantamount to a prima facie violation of the
free exercise clause. As Justice Brennan put it in Sherbert, "To condition the
availability of benefits upon [a religious claimant's] willingness to violate a
146. See, e.g., Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1
(1947).
147. See Bittker & Rahdert, The Exemption of Nonprofit Organizations from Federal, Income
Taxation, 85 YALE L.J. 299 (1976); Bittker, Churches, Taxes and the Constitution, 78 YALE L.J.
1287 (1969).
148. See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
149. 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
150. Id. at 717-18.
151. See supra notes 84-88 and accompanying text.
19901
DEPA UL LA W RE VIE W
cardinal principle of... religious faith effectively penalizes the free exercise of
• .. constitutional liberties."' 52 As I have suggested above, under the ever ex-
panding IRS regulations, religious bodies are now subjected to Hobson's
choices: either to forego the advantage of exemption or to accept exempt sta-
tus and thereby forfeit certain political freedoms that may be at the heart of
their religious commitments. It was just that sort of false choice between valu-
able and desirable goals that the Court prohibited in Sherbert.
Under standard free exercise analysis, the government might nonetheless
prevail in a direct challenge to this statute if it could show that it has utilized
the least restrictive means of achieving a truly compelling governmental inter-
est."' It is difficult to imagine any legitimate governmental interest within a
representative democracy in favor of limiting the effectiveness of those who
wish to speak about legislative proposals that affect the common weal. Perhaps
the interest is one of "neutrality"'"' grounded in the no-establishment princi-
ple, according to which the government merely declines to provide financial
support to religious groups for their activities relating to politics (note the cen-
trality of the view that exemption is a subsidy).
Whatever interests may underlie the restrictions on political campaigning
and lobbying found in I.R.C. § 501(c)(3), as I noted above in my comments
on the legislative history of this provision, Congress has not articulated
them. 5 To the contrary, as a direct result of the testimony by various repre-
sentatives of religious bodies cited above, Congress expressly declined to give
its approval or disapproval' 56 to the Christian Echoes case, the only case in
which a federal court of appeals attempted to formulate for Congress a ration-
ale supporting these restrictions as applied to a religious organization.' 17 Nor
has any court found these interests to be truly "compelling" or of "paramount
importance."' 8
The restrictions on political speech in section 501(c)(3) are likewise defi-
cient because they are by no means the alternative least restrictive of the free
152. 347 U.S. 398, 406 (1964).
153. See, e.g., Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136 (1987); Thomas v.
Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 718-19 (1981); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406-09 (1963).
154. For a richly nuanced discussion of the concept of "neutrality" in religion clause jurispru-
dence, see Laycock, Formal, Substantive, and Disaggregated Neutrality Toward Religion, 39
DEPAUL L. REv. 993 (1990).
155. As I noted in Section 1 of this Article, no hearings were held in the House Ways and
Means Committee or the Senate Finance Committee before Congress adopted the restraint on
lobbying imposed in the 1934 statute or in the Johnson amendment in 1954 banning political
campaign activity by exempt organizations.
156. "It is the intent of Congress that enactment of this section [501(h)] is not to be regarded
in any way as an approval or disapproval of the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit in Christian Echoes National Ministry, Inc. v. United States, 470 F.2d 849 (10th Cir.
1972) or of the reasoning in any of the opinions leading to that decision." Tax Reform Act of
1976, Pub. L. No. 84-455, § 1307(b)(3), 90 Stat. 1722.
157. Christian Echoes Nat'l Ministry, Inc. v. Uhited States, 470 F.2d 849 (10th Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 864 (1973).
158. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945).
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exercise and free speech rights of exempt organizations. It is difficult to imag-
ine a restriction more total than the "absolute prohibition" on any participa-
tion by a 501(c)(3) organization in a political campaign, whether on behalf of
or in opposition to a candidate for public office.1"
Although I recognize that the constitutionality of the tax statute and regula-
tions governing the activities of exempt religious organizations is subtle and
complicated, the reasons I have sketched here have persuaded me that it ill
accords with free exercise or free speech jurisprudence to restrain the civil
liberties of religious organizations in the way the tax code purports to do. As
was suggested by the extensive congressional testimony referred to above, the
activities of these religious organizations are almost invariably motivated by
deeply held religious convictions. Exempt religious organizations by no means
agree with one another about many of the issues on today's political agenda,
but they tend to agree strongly that they should have a perfect right to address
the underlying moral aspects of these divisive political issues.16
The ways in which they might do so represent a continuum with a range of
options from undeniably protected speech (such as legislative testimony in re-
sponse to a committee invitation) to imaginable but highly improbable acts
(such as direct coercion of political decisions by ecclesiastical potentates). As I
indicated above, long before the Internal Revenue Code there has been a con-
tinuous and extensive historical practice in our society that has accorded reli-
gion a significant role in American politics.' 61 In my view, the prudential deci-
159. The Service's interpretation of § 501(c)(3) creates an environment in which "churches
must act at their peril as they attempt to walk the obscure line between loss of exemption and
faithfulness to the obligation to speak out on the moral dimension of important social issues."
Caron & Dessingue, supra note 92, at 178.
160. GOD ALONE IS LORD OF THE CONSCIENCE, supra note 3, at 48-49. The author states:
Participation in public life implies both support for and criticism of the public order.
Religious bodies and people of faith hold to a wide variety of convictions, ideas, and
values that make important contributions to the shape and strength of public life.
That life has been shaped by individuals and groups that have sought to create new
forms, sustain traditional ones, challenge existing ideologies and reform or resist un-
just institutions. Participation is thus viewed by the government sometimes as a bless-
ing and at other times as a threat. It is not surprising that many, particularly those
who hold power, often prefer less participation by citizens and groups in the public
arena, including those motivated by religious convictions, or at least wish that such
participation be limited to a supportive role.
The participation of church bodies and believers in public life has seldom gone
uncriticized or unchallenged and that is perhaps more true today than ever. Religious
groups have participated vigorously on both sides of public policy debates on Central
America and abortion, in the face of internal criticism and public challenges, both
legal and rhetorical.
Id.
161. As Dean Kelley, the executive for religious and civil liberty of the National Council of
Churches, has observed:
Churches are bound by their sense of mission, their consecrated obedience to God, to
speak out on issues where the well-being of persons is at stake, to proclaim what they
believe is the right and moral course for the whole society and what will benefit every-
one, not just themselves or their members. Churches were doing this sort of thing
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sian as to where to draw the line along this continuum is more properly made
by the speakers rather than by the government.
The free exercise precedents upon which I rely here are those which estab-
lished that restraints on religious freedom are permissible only if the govern-
ment can show that the denial of accommodation of the religious interest is
required by a truly compelling governmental interest that cannot be served by
less restrictive means. That line of authority began in Sherbert v. Verner.1 62
The claim can be made that Sherbert has been limited to its facts in the re-
cent decision in Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v.
Smith, where five Justices abandoned the compelling interest standard and
ruled that "an individual's religious beliefs [do not] excuse him from compli-
ance with an otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct that the State is free to
regulate." 6 ' Notwithstanding the severe blow to effective judicial protection
that the Smith case represents, the discussion in this Article of the problems
posed to religious organizations by the restraints found in I.R.C. § 501(c)(3)
may be taken to offer reasons why Congress ought to liberate religious organi-
zations from those restraints of the tax code. This approach to the problem,
moreover, is not entirely inconsistent with the view of Justice Scalia, who
wrote in Smith:
Values that are protected against government interference through en-
shrinement in the Bill of Rights are not thereby banished from the political
process. Just as a society that believes that the negative protection accorded
to the press in the first amendment is likely to enact laws that affirmatively
foster the dissemination of the printed word, so also a society that believes in
the negative protection accorded to religious belief can be expected to be
solicitous of that value in its legislation as well.'
Although I profoundly disagree 66 with Justice Scalia about the degree of
"negative protection" that the first amendment affords to religious faith and
practice,1 66 I quite agree that, when the judiciary has so narrow a view of
before there were legislatures or lobbies, and they will continue to do so-despite
whatever odds or obstacles-as long as there are churches.
D. KELLEY, WHY CHURCHES SHOULD NOT PAY TAXES 86 (1977).
162. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
163. 110 S. Ct. 1595, 1600 (1990) (rejecting legitimacy of claim for unemployment compensa-
tion benefit by Native American terminated because of sacramental use of peyote).
164. Id. at 1606.
165. I was one of scores of law professors who signed the unsuccessful petition for rehearing in
this case. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595, reh'g denied,
110 S. Ct. 2605 (1990). See Laycock, The Supreme Court's Assault on Free Exercise, and the
Amicus Brief That Was Never Filed, 8 J.U & RELIG. - (1990).
166. One reason for my disagreement with Justice Scalia is my view that the judiciary was
intended from the beginning to check the excesses of governmental power claimed by the political
branches. See, e.g., McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of
Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1449-1503 (1990). Another reason is that history has repeat-
edly demonstrated that the political branches of government cannot safely be trusted to secure the
rights of unpopular minorities against ugly majoritarian impulses. See, e.g., G. MYERS, HISTORY
OF BIGOTRY IN THE UNITED STATES (H. Christman ed. 1960). Justice Scalia himself acknowl-
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constitutional liberty, it is appropriate to turn to the political branches for
more effective protection. That, in fact, is what the religious community has
done in the wake of Smith. Within weeks after the decision was announced,
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1990 was introduced in Congress to
create a federal statutory claim to freedom of religious exercise at least as
secure as that afforded under judicial doctrine before Smith. 67 Although it is
premature to suggest that this legislation will be enacted promptly, at least it
is safe to state that the rumors of the demise of the compelling governmental
interest standard for protecting religious liberty are, to use Mark Twain's
phrase, "greatly exaggerated."
VII. WHO MAY ENFORCE THE TAX CODE'S RESTRAINTS ON POLITICAL
ACTIVITIES OF RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS?
The question of who may enforce the tax code's restraints on the political
activities of religious organizations was'brought to court in 1980. A coalition
of organizations that provide abortion services, as well as a group of individual
plaintiffs in their capacities as voters or as members of the clergy, sued the
Secretary of the Treasury and the United States Catholic Conference.""8
Known as the Abortion Rights Mobilization ("ARM") case because of the
name of the lead plaintiff, this lawsuit lasted over a. decade before it came to
an end in 1990.169 The relief sought in this lawsuit was that the federal court
would order the IRS to revoke the tax-exempt status of the United States
Catholic Conference and the National Conference of Catholic Bishops, the
civil and canonical entities under which the hierarchy of the Roman Catholic
Church in this country is structured. The basis for the complaint was that
various church officials had made pronouncements relating to abortion, includ-
ing alleged statements urging the faithful not to vote for particular
candidates.' 7 o
edges, in a grossly understated way, the nature of the difficulty: "It may fairly be said that leaving
accommodation to the political process will place at a relative disadvantage those religious prac-
tices that are not widely engaged in .... " Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1606.
167. H.R. 5377, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990). Similar legislation will also be introduced in the
Senate.
168. For an account of the plaintiffs' perspectives in this case, see L. LADER, POLITICS, POWER
AND THE CHURCH (1987).
169. Abortion Rights Mobilization, Inc. v. Regan, 544 F. Supp. 471 (S.D.N.Y.), certification
denied, 552 F. Supp. 364 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); Abortion Rights Mobilization, Inc. v. Regan, 603 F.
Supp. 970 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Abortion Rights Mobilization, Inc. v. Baker, 110 F.R.D. 337
(S.D.N.Y. 1986), afd sub nom, In re United States Catholic Conference, 824 F.2d 156 (2d Cir.
1987), rev'd sub nom. United States Catholic Conference v. Abortion Rights Mobilization, Inc.,
487 US. 72 (1988) (remanding for determination of standing of plaintiffs), on remand, 885 F.2d
1020 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1946 (1990).
170. See Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint 19-28 at 6-9, Abortion Rights Mobilization, Inc. v.
Regan, 544 F. Supp. 471 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). The plaintiffs alleged that pastors had endorsed candi-
dates, collected money for right to life activities, and had distributed leaflets on abortion within
parish bulletins, all allegedly because of a Pastoral Plan for Pro-Life Activities adopted by the
NCCB in 1975. This document called for pastoral, educational, and public policy initiatives to
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After years of costly litigation, the Supreme Court ruled unanimously in
1988 that the church was at least entitled to challenge the jurisdiction of the
court that had imposed coercive fines in the amount of $100,000 a day on the
church for its refusal to hand over massive amounts of sensitive internal docu-
ments to outsiders."' In 1989, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit dismissed the ARM case for lack of standing.' 72 The plaintiffs
then sought review in the Supreme Court, but the Court denied the writ of
certiorari.' 73
The suit's potential consequences for religious organizations were severe. 7 4
The major legal barrier to such lawsuits is the technical and often conflicting
rules of standing to sue.' 75 It is not necessary to discuss the intricacies of this
area of the law, but three basic concepts about standing must be appreciated
in order to grasp the significance of the ARM case.
The first major concept about standing is that it serves as a restraint on
judicial power.'7 6 For example, taxpayers do not generally have enough of a
stake in the outcome of a lawsuit to challenge congressional acts with which
they disagree.177 If the rule were otherwise, virtually every piece of legislation
would be subject to challenge in federal court by a disgruntled taxpayer, an
outcome that would give the judiciary much greater authority over public pol-
icy than our system of separated and limited powers contemplates. 78 After the
change attitudes and the law relating to abortion.
171. United States Catholic Conference v. Abortion Rights Mobilization, Inc., 487 U.S. 72
(1988) (remanding for determination of standing of plaintiffs).
172. In re United States Catholic Conference v. Abortion Rights Mobilization, 885 F.2d 1020
(2d Cir 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1946 (1990).
173. Id.
174. Contrary to the view in Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970), that the first
amendment needs "play in the joints" in order to function smoothly, the view of the plaintiffs
called for inflexibility and rigidity. This seems apparent by their conduct of the litigation, which
sought vast amounts of sensitive internal religious records. It likewise seemed to be the stated
purpose of the suit, which was to give any opponent of the teachings of a religious body access to
federal court to seek an injunction to compel the revocation of that church's exemption from the
payment of federal income tax, resulting in a series of cascading events flowing from the loss of
that status. With the loss of exempt status under I.R.C. § 501(c)(3), a religious body would not
only have to pay taxes on all net income, but all contributions to the church would no longer be
deductible by the contributing taxpayer who itemizes. I.R.C. § 170(c)(2)(D). It would also have
consequences for the administration of federal estate tax, I.R.C. §§ 2055(a)(2) and
2106(a)(2)(A)(ii), and federal gift tax, I.R.C. § 2522(a)(2). In addition, most of -the states have
parallel provisions in their tax codes which incorporate I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) by reference, for pur-
poses of determining the exemption of a religious body from payment of a wide variety of state
and local taxes. Some states, moreover, predicate their regulatory authority over an entity seeking
charitable contributions on the entity's federal tax-exempt status, conferring, for example, an ex-
emption from annual reporting requirements to groups which are exempt under § 501(c)(3).
175. Compare Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church
& State, 454 U.S. 464 (1982) with Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968). For a further discussion
of the tension between these cases, see infra note 181.
176. E. CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 2.3.1, at 49-50 (1989).
177. Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
178. In Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968), the Court acknowledged that the standing require-
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outpouring of public outrage against the Court's sensible rulings on school
prayer in the 1960s, 179 however, the Court modified the general rule on tax-
payer standing in Flast v. Cohen,'8" allowing a taxpayer to sue to prohibit a
congressional expenditure that seems to violate the no-establishment provision
of the religion clause.'
Another major concept is that the limitation on judicial power that is rele-
vant to the ARM case is not simply a policy of judicial self-restraint that
arises out of prudential concerns, but is required by the text of the federal
constitution. Article III limits the jurisdiction of federal courts to "cases or
controversies." According to a leading decision construing this provision, Si-
mon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization,18' a plaintiff suing in
federal court must demonstrate actual or threatened injury that can fairly be
"traced to the challenged action," and that "is likely to be redressed by a
favorable decision.' 83 William Simon was sued in his official capacity as Sec-
retary of the Treasury because he had removed from the tax regulations the
requirement that exempt hospitals provide below-cost health care to indigents.
The suit sought either restoration of below-cost health care or revocation of
the tax-exempt status of third party organizations that provided health care.
The Supreme Court dismissed the case because it found no causal link be-
tween the Revenue Ruling and a reduction in services to the indigents on
whose behalf the welfare rights organization was suing. Justice Powell wrote
that "[i]t is purely speculative whether the denials of service specified in the
complaint fairly could be traced to petitioners' encouragement or instead re-
sult from decisions made by the hospitals without regard to the tax
ment limits the jurisdiction of federal courts "to those disputes which confine federal courts to a
role consistent with a system of separated powers and which are traditionally thought to be capa-
ble of resolution through the judicial process," id. at 97, but stated that standing did not, "by its
own force, raise separation of powers problems." id. at 100. After some hints in the 1970s that
this theme was significant in standing doctrine, see, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498-500
(1975); Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 220-27 (1974), the
Court adopted the position in Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984), that separation of
powers is the "single basic idea" on which the standing doctrine is built.
179. Abington Township School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370
U.S. 421 (1962). For an account of the popular reaction to these decisions, see generally K.
DOLBEARE & P. HAMMOND, THE SCHOOL PRAYER DECISIONS: FROM COURT POLICY TO LOCAL
PRACTICE (1971); W. K. MUIR, PRAYER IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS: LAW AND ATTITUDE CHANGE
(1967).
180. 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
181. The Flast Court held that the plaintiff must show both a Congressional expenditure under
the taxing and spending clause of the Constitution and a "nexus" to a specific constitutional limit
on the taxing and spending power. Id. at 102. The Flast exception to the general prohibition of
taxpayers' suits is quite narrow. See Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for
Separation of Church & State, 454 U.S. 464, 478-80 (1982) (Flast does not apply to actions by
executive agency or to Congressional exercise of power under the property clause). For criticism
of the distinctions drawn in Valley Forge, see E. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 176, § 2.3.5, at 82; L.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 128 (2d ed. 1988).
182. 426 U.S. 26 (1976).
183. Id. at 38, 41.
1990]
DEPA UL LA W RE VIE W
implications." 18'
Allen v. Wright'8" is another standing decision that is crucial to the under-
standing of the ARM case. In fact, it is in many respects quite similar. In
Allen, the plaintiffs attempted to compel the Commissioner of Internal Reve-
nue to revoke the federal tax-exempt status of private schools that maintained
a policy of racial discrimination in student admissions. 86 Despite the fact that
the IRS had issued clear administrative rules governing this matter, the Court
refused to allow taxpayers to bring suit in federal court to enforce those guide-
lines."87 Justice O'Connor wrote that even if a plaintiff has sustained an injury,
standing is still deficient where "the injury alleged is not fairly traceable to the
Government's conduct ... challenge[d] as unlawful." '88 As in Simon, the Al-
len Court reasoned that it was "entirely speculative whether withdrawal of the
tax exemption of racially discriminatory schools would have any impact on the
ability of [the plaintiffs'] children to receive a desegregated education. ' 9
The third concept of standing useful to the analysis of the ARM case is that
although Congress may not confer standing where the Constitution forbids it,
it may confer standing where merely prudential considerations may have led
federal judges to deny standing. 10 Although the ARM plaintiffs did not claim
statutory standing, the basic posture that they maintained throughout the liti-
gation was that of a private attorney-general seeking to compel enforcement of
the tax law against a third party. Far from conferring statutory standing on
private parties like the ARM plaintiffs, however, Congress has given several
indications in the tax code that support the opposite conclusion.' In short,
Congress plainly intended the administration of the code, including the grant-
ing and revocation of exempt status under section 501(c)(3), to be within the
discretion of the federal officials in the IRS over whom Congress has a great
deal of control through the oversight process, rather than within the boundless
imagination of plaintiffs seeking to enforce their notions of tax equity in the
184. Id. at 42-43.
185. 468 U.S. 737 (1984).
186. Id. at 746-47.
187. Id. at 747.
188. Id. at 757.
189. Id. at 758.
190. E. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 176, § 2.3.1, at 52.
191. In the Anti-injunction Act, I.R.C. § 7421(A), Congress prohibited suits to restrain assess-
ment or collection of any tax, whether brought by a taxpayer or, as here, by a third party. Con-.
gress has delegated the administration and enforcement of the tax laws exclusively to the Secre-
tary and the Commissioner. I.R.C. § 7801(a). In addition, Congress gave to the federal
respondents the power to "prescribe all needful rules and regulations for the enforcement of"
those laws. I.R.C. § 7805(a). And Congress reserved for itself the task of overseeing the enforce-
ment of the revenue laws by creating a Joint Committee on Taxation to investigate the adminis-
tration, operation, and effects of the tax system. I.R.C. §§ 8001-8023. These provisions reflect
congressional intent to operate the tax system within the legislative and executive branches. Con-
gress, moreover, has expressly mandated that the IRS maintain the confidentiality of tax records,
I.R.C. § 6103, and out of concern for the delicate character of religious freedom, Congress has
expressly limited the power of the IRS to conduct audits of church bodies. I.R.C. § 7611.
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federal courts. 9
One of the reasons why Congress has entrusted delicate decisions concern-
ing the exempt status of religious organizations to officials in the IRS is that
they take an oath of office to support the constitutional limits on their own
authority. Private litigants with their own agenda are under no such obligation
to take into account the protections of the first amendment. If the ARM case
is any indication, the likelihood that disgruntled third parties will be sensitive
to the free exercise and free speech concerns of religious organizations they
oppose is slim. To the contrary, the probability that religious organizations will
become the target of third parties hostile to their religious perspective is high.
With this much of an introduction to the law of standing, it is possible to
apply these principles to the ARM case. Judge Robert Carter, the judge who
presided over the case at the trial level, denied taxpayer standing to the plain-
tiffs, but ruled that they had standing, either as voters' 93 or as members of the
clergy'94 to challenge the tax-exempt status of a major religious denomination.
The basis for this ruling was that, by failing to revoke the church's exempt
status, the IRS had allegedly "denigrated" the plaintiffs' religious beliefs and
"frustrated" their ministry by giving "tacit government endorsement of the
Roman Catholic Church view of abortion.' 95
A. Voter Standing
Ignoring the dictates of Simon and Allen, Judge Carter conferred standing
on the plaintiffs in their capacity as voters on the view that they had somehow
been disadvantaged by the "preferential treatment" of the church by the IRS.
The fallacious premise for this view is that taxed contributions translate into
less voting power than nontaxed contributions. This analysis is flawed for two
reasons. First, the plaintiffs experienced no cognizable injury in their capacity
as voters. The actual voting power of each individual plaintiff at the polling
place is not in the least restricted by campaign activities, whether conducted
by taxed or tax-exempt organizations. Unlike the diluted political strength of
the voters who sued successfully in Baker v. Carr, 9 6 the major redistricting
case of the Warren Court era, the votes of the plaintiffs in the ARM case are
192. Even when suits to compel the executive branch to undertake enforcement committed to
its discretion are "premised on allegations of several instances of violations of law, [they] are
rarely if ever appropriate for federal-court adjudication." Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 759-60
(1984). Noting that an agency decision regarding enforcement proceedings "has long been re-
garded as the special province of the Executive Branch, inasmuch as it is the Executive who is
charged by the Constitution to 'take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed,' " Heckler v.
Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985) (citing U.S. CONST. art. 11, § 3), the Court has emphasized
that executive agency decisions not to enforce are characteristically unsuitable for judicial resolu-
tion because this discretionary choice "often involves a complicated balancing of a number of
factors which are peculiarly within its expertise." Id. at 831.
193. Abortion Rights Mobilization, Inc. v. Regan, 544 F. Supp. 471, 480-82 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
194. Id. at 478-79.
195. Id. at 480.
196. 369 U.S. 186, 208 (1962).
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no less significant than that of other voters.
Second, even if it were assumed that the ARM plaintiffs had suffered some
palpable injury to their rights of franchise, the injury was not caused by the
actions of the government, as it was in Baker v. Carr through the refusal of
the Tennessee legislature to redraw voting district lines for over six decades.
The injury claimed by the ARM plaintiffs is the purported "added influence"
that the Catholic Church has because of deductible contributions which it may
spend on campaigns opposing abortion. This claimed injury is actually tracea-
ble neither to the IRS nor even to the church itself, but to third party taxpay-
ers who choose voluntarily to make charitable contributions to the church. It is
purely conjectural to believe that taxing these charitable gifts will diminish in
any significant way the voluntary giving to that church. 97 It is still more spec-
ulative to imagine that taxing these gifts would decrease in any significant way
that church's efforts to influence abortion policy in this country, for the
church's campaign against abortion is grounded in sincerely held religious be-
liefs. Because the claimed injury to voting rights is not a cognizable injury
that is traceable to governmental action or redressable by a court order, it is
insufficient to confer standing on private parties in their capacity as voters to
challenge the exempt status of a religious organization.
The remedy sought by the plaintiffs as voters, moreover, does not advance
the first amendment goal of affording more voices to be heard in our democ-
racy. To the contrary, it seeks to penalize those who espouse a viewpoint on a
public controversy different from their own. It would thus have the effect of
diminishing the flow of information to voters and to elected representatives.
Allowing voters to resort to the courts to revoke the exempt status of a reli-
gious body because of its dissemination of views on matters of public concern
has the inevitable effect of chilling the expression of moral views that clearly
relate to public policy choices, even if the voter-plaintiffs stoutly maintain that
they are not opposed to dissemination of opposing viewpoints.198 Although
Dean Ely and others have advanced sound arguments for allowing voters
greater access to the judiciary in order to ensure fuller participation in the
political process by all,199 it makes no sense to expand the power of the
nonpolitical branch to issue rulings that have the effect of chilling or diminish-
ing the pluralistic character of debate on matters of public concern. For this
reason as well, the conclusion that the ARM plaintiffs had standing as voters
to challenge the exempt status of the church was flawed.
197. The hypothetical character of the plaintiffs' claim is underscored by the fact that the
majority of taxpayers (60.8 % in tax year 1985) do not itemize charitable contributions, but prefer
to take the standard deduction. IRS STATISTICS OF INCOME DIVISION BULLETIN I (Winter 1986-
1987). With the increase of the standard deduction in the Tax Reform Act of 1986, tax analysts
expect a further decrease in the number of taxpayers who itemize.
198. The ramifications of the view espoused by the ARM plaintiffs are potentially broad, affect-
ing the exempt status of nonreligious charitable organizations that engage in controversial
activities.
199. See, e.g., J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 105-25 (1980).
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B. Clergy Standing
Judge Carter also conferred standing on the individual plaintiffs in ARM
who were members of the clergy. He did so on the view that the activities of
the church violated the rights of these clergy plaintiffs secured under the es-
tablishment clause. This conclusion is erroneous for three reasons. First, as the
Supreme Court made clear in Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans
United for Separation of Church and State,200 the mere fact that a plaintiff
seeks relief under the establishment clause does not mean that the normal
requirements for standing are diminished. Important as the prohibition against
governmental establishment of religion is in our society, it nonetheless remains
true that not "all constitutional provisions are enforceable by any citizen sim-
ply because citizens are the ultimate beneficiaries of those provisions. ' 01
Second, as I mentioned above, a plaintiff must show direct and palpable
injury caused by the illegal conduct of the defendant, not mere psychological
distress produced because one's view of the constitutional order has been of-
fended. Thus, in Valley Forge, the Court held that the plaintiffs lacked stand-
ing because they "fail[ed] to identify any personal injury suffered by them as
a consequence of the alleged constitutional error, other than the psychological
consequence presumably produced by observation of conduct with which one
disagrees. ' 20 2 Similarly, in Allen, the Supreme Court denied standing to black
parents who claimed that they suffered "stigmatic" injury because of the tax-
exempt status of segregated private schools, on the view that the alleged injury
was too abstract to fulfill standing requirements. 03
Mere mechanical pleadings raising claims of abstract stigmatic injury are
not enough to expose a not-for-profit religious organization to costly litigation
initiated by its ideological adversaries. The claimed injury to the clergy in this
case was as intangible as the "psychological" injury found insufficient to con-
fer standing in Valley Forge and the "abstract stigmatic" injury addressed in
Allen. The extent of the "injury" to these members of the clergy is easy to
assert, but difficult if not impossible to prove or disprove. It is hard to imagine
how the ability of the clergy plaintiffs to minister to their flocks could be
helped in any significant way by the outcome of this litigation. They were not
in the position of an entity that had lost its exempt status and had gone to
court seeking restoration of that status. Rather, they went to court seeking the
revocation of the exempt status of a third party.
Third, the substantive theory of the plaintiffs' argument in ARM was based
on the view that the restrictions imposed by I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) on activities of
religious organizations relating to politics are required by the first amend-
ment.2 04 It is contrary to the clear teaching of the Walz case to suppose that
200. 454 U.S. 464 (1982).
201. Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 227 (1974).
202. Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State,
454 U.S. 464, 485 (1982) (emphasis in original).
203. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 754-56 (1984).
204. Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint, 1 16, 17, Abortion Rights Mobilization, Inc. v. Regan,
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the grant of tax-exempt status to a religious body constitutes, as the district
court imagined, impermissible "government endorsement of the Roman Cath-
olic Church view of abortion" or "official approval of an orthodoxy."2 °6 And it
is equally fanciful to suppose that the Secretary of the Treasury and the Com-
missioner of the IRS impliedly "denigrated" the religious beliefs of the plain-
tiffs who are members of the clergy or have in any way "frustrated" their
ministry by leaving the Catholics alone. Although the plaintiffs who are clergy
members may subjectively feel that their beliefs are "denigrated" by the tax-
exempt status of the Catholic Church, that is not enough to establish standing
under the Court's teaching in either Simon or Allen. It is equally speculative
to conclude, as the district court did, that the revocation of the tax-exempt
status of a religious body necessarily marks its decline in influence. This belief
ignores the myriad factors that influence the moral vitality and decline of a
religious community." 6
Like others who either favor or oppose abortion (with many shades of grey
in between those two stark alternatives), the ARM plaintiffs have first amend-
ment protection in advocating their views. Those who supported the Catholic
Church in the ARM case included Jews and Christians who agree with the
Catholic Church's official teaching on abortion, as well as Jews and Christians
who emphatically do not agree with that teaching."0 This diversity among
religious bodies demonstrates, at the very least, that the moral teaching of
various religious bodies on abortion has not been contingent upon the teaching
of the Catholic Church on this matter, let alone on the even more attenuated
question of whether that church enjoys tax-exempt status. As Judge Dooling
wrote in the Hyde Amendment case:
[lit is clear that the healthy working of our political order cannot safely
forego the political action of the churches, or discourage it. The reliance, as
always, must be on giving an alert and critical hearing to every informed
voice, and the spokesmen of religious institutions must not be discouraged
nor inhibited by the fear that their support of legislation, or explicit lobby-
ing for such legislation, will result in its being constitutionally suspect.20 8
For the reasons that I have presented here, I am convinced that if the task
544 F. Supp. 471 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
205. 544 F. Supp. 471, 480 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
206. See, e.g., D. KELLEY, WHY CONSERVATIVE CHURCHES ARE GROWING (1977).
207. For example, in joining an amicus curiae brief filed in the Supreme Court in the Abortion
Rights Mobilization case, the Stated Clerk of the Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) noted:
The policies established by the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church
(U.S.A.) are not in agreement with the views of the petitioners [United States Catho-
lic Conference] with regard to matters of abortion rights and pro-life issues, but are
in substantial agreement with the views on constitutional rights and religious liberty
expressed in this brief.
Brief Amicus Curiae of National Council of Churches, No. 87-416, at App. 2, United States
Catholic Conference v. Abortion Rights Mobilization, Inc., 484 U.S. 975 (1987).
208. McRae v. Califano, 491 F. Supp. 630, 741 (E.D.N.Y.), rev'd on other grounds, sub nom.
Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 294, rehg denied, 448 U.S. 917 (1980).
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of revocation of the exempt status of a religious organization because of its
activities relating to politics is to be exercised at all, it should be by the IRS
rather than by federal judges acting at the behest of the opponents of the
religious organization." 9 If the appellate court had not repudiated the stand-
ing rule adopted by Judge Carter in the ARM case, it could easily have
opened up the floodgates to litigation against churches by those hostile to their
mission or ideas.210
The potential for mischief of this sort, moreover, is compounded by the sug-
gestion in Bob Jones University v. United States,"' that a religious organiza-
tion may lose its exempt status by failing to conform with "public policy," 12 "
or by failing to "be in harmony with the public interest."' 2 3 The district
court's approach to standing in ARM, moreover, is not limited to religious not-
for-profit organizations, but could readily affect exempt charitable organiza-
tions that are secular in character. For example, a member of the Ku Klux
Klan who is a registered voter could sue the Secretary of the Treasury to
revoke the exempt status of the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund
if the civil rights education fund were to participate in voter education deemed
impermissible under the restrictive regulations on voter education discussed in
Part II of this Article. Similarly, opponents and proponents of gun control
could use the courts, rather than the halls of Congress and other legislative
chambers, to carry on their debates. Even if their suits were ultimately dis-
missed on the merits, they would have at least succeeded in obtaining valuable
information about their opponents that would otherwise be unavailable to
them.
Finally, even if lawsuits such as the ARM case are eventually decided on
the merits in favor of the religious body attacked by private parties in the
court, significant harm to religious freedom may result, as the ARM case itself
illustrates, from subjecting the religious body to inquiries which violate the
legitimate autonomy of the religious body. The cost of defending such suits,
moreover, represents a significant diversion of funds earmarked for charitable
209. I do not deny that there is some room for meaningful judicial review of agency determina-
tions. For example, a different case would be presented if the IRS had wrongfully denied exempt
status to a religious organization because of the administration of the statute with "an evil eye and
an unequal hand." Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886); see also Larson v. Valente, 456
U.S. 228 (1982) (invalidating state charitable solicitation statute that was purposefully designed
to treat an unpopular religious group unequally).
210. See, e.g., Khalaf v. Regan, 85-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9269 (D.D.C. 1985), afd, No.
85-5274 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 19, 1986) (dismissing on standing principles effort of anti-Zionist organi-
zation to revoke exempt status of Jewish charitable organizations because of their support of
Israel); American Soc'y of Travel Agents, Inc. v. Blumenthal, 566 F.2d 145 (D.C. Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 435 U.S. 947 (1978) (dismissing on standing principles attack on exempt status of
American Jewish Congress by business competitors).
211. 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
212. Id. at 586.
213. Id. at 592. But see id. at 606-12 (Powell, J., concurring) (rejecting suggestion that "pri-
mary function of exempt organizations is to act on behalf of the Government in carrying out
governmentally approved policies").
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works. Religious bodies do not normally construe the biblical command to feed
the hungry 214 to refer primarily to lawyers. At the very least, such diversion of
funds cannot be justified on the basis of protecting litigants whose tax liability
is not at issue, and will not be affected by the outcome of the litigation.
VIII. CONCLUSION: THE PROSPECT OF REPEAL OF THE RESTRAINTS IN THE
TAX CODE ON THE ACTIVITIES OF RELIGIOUS BODIES RELATING TO
POLITICS
I have discussed elsewhere that Lutherans and Baptists were willing to
mount a legal challenge to the tax regulations governing an "integrated auxil-
iary of a church.1215 They prevailed in the claim that the regulation interfered
with the church's understanding of its ministry and mission. It is conceivable
that some religious organization may plan similar test-case litigation to chal-
lenge the constitutionality of the restraints imposed on exempt religious orga-
nizations that are described in this Article. For example, the General Assem-
bly of the Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) affirmed the following proposition in
1988:
We oppose attempts by government to limit or deny religious participation
in public life by statute or regulation, including Internal Revenue Service
regulations on the amount or percentage of money used to influence legisla-
tion, and prohibition of church intervention in political campaigns. We will
join with others, as occasion permits, to seek repeal of such regulations and
statutes, or a definitive ruling by the Supreme Court on their
constitutionality. 21 6
If litigation is filed seeking a definitive ruling on the constitutionality of I.R.C.
§ 501(c)(3) and the IRS regulations promulgated under it, arguments along
the lines sketched in this Article will undoubtedly be offered to the Court.
It is by no means clear, however, that such litigation is likely. For one thing,
the costs of litigation can be severe. Furthermore, the stakes-including poten-
tial loss of exempt status for the litigant-are very high. Three tendencies in
the present Court suggest that there is at least a very good possibility that the
offending statute and regulations would be sustained. First, the Court has indi-
cated in TWR that it has drifted toward acceptance of the view that an ex-
emption is a subsidy.21 7 Second, the Court has not been very generous with
free exercise claims outside of the narrow fields of unemployment compensa-
tion benefits for sabbatarians and exemptions from military duty for conscien-
tious objectors.215 Third, a majority of the Court has a self-restrained view of
214. E.g., Isaiah 58:7; Matthew 25:35.
215. See Gaffney, Governmental Definition of Religion: The Rise and Fall of the IRS Regula-
tions on an 'Integrated Auxiliary of a Church," 25 VAL. U.L. REV. - (1991).
216. GOD ALONE IS LORD OF THE CONSCIENCE, supra note 3, at 52.
217. Regan v. Taxation With Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 544 (1983).
218. The unemployment compensation cases are: Frazee v. Illinois Dep't of Employment Sec.,
109 S. Ct. 1514 (1989); Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136 (1987);
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its constitutional mission, according to which great deference is given to the
determinations of the coordinate political branches. Almost an extreme exam-
ple of this tendency was the Court's willingness in Goldman v. Weinberger to
allow the military to expel an Orthodox Jew who insisted on wearing a yar-
mulke under the normal uniform cap. 19 In light of considerations like these,
there is a certain wisdom in the Presbyterian statement's putting the option of
seeking a definitive ruling from the Supreme Court last.
Perhaps the first path to explore is the administrative path. Ever since the
"integrated auxiliary" episode, IRS officials and religious leaders have institu-
tionalized contact with one another that enables both the regulators and the
regulated to communicate their needs clearly and effectively. This channel
may continue to be explored so that the more offensive of the Revenue Rulings
may be revoked by the Service without the need for costly and protracted
litigation, such as that the churches engaged in as plaintiffs in the contest over
the "integrated auxiliary" issue or as a target for a revocation action brought
by private parties in the ARM case.
But at some point in the conversation, the most cordial official in the execu-
tive branch is bound to say, "My hands are tied by the statute." At that point
the forum clearly must be shifted to the legislative branch. There are, how-
ever, some problems with initiating much of a dialogue with Congress on the
subject at the present time. In general, Congress rarely looks back on a policy
Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981); Sherbert v. Ver-
ner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). There have been some victories for free exercise claimants outside of
this area. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). The cases in which free exercise
claims have been rejected have been considerable. See, e.g., Employment Div., Dep't of Human
Resources v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595 (1990); Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Board of Equaliza-
tion, 110 S. Ct. 688 (1990); Hernandez v. Comm'r, 109 S. Ct. 2136 (1989); Lyng v, Northwest
Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988); Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986);
Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986) (effect nullified by subsequent legislation); Tony &
Susan Alamo Found. v. Secretary of Labor, 471 U.S. 290 (1985); Bob Jones Univ. v. United
States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983); United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982).
In Lee the federal government prevailed against a challenge to the imposition of Social Security
tax on Amish employers whose employees did. not participate in Social Security benefits because
of religious principle. United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 260-61 (1982). For the view that the
Lee Court "weaken[ed] both aspects of the required state showing," see L. TRIBE, supra note 181,
at 1260-61. As a result, the interest of the government in maintaining a fiscally "sound" tax
system, or a "fair" one, has been elevated virtually to the level of a "compelling" interest that
overrides any religious claims, including the claim to an immunity from sales and use tax for
distribution of religious literature to members of one's own religious organization. Jimmy Swag-
gart Ministries v. Board of Equalization, 110 S. Ct. 688, 695-96 (1990).
In the context of conscientious objection to military service, see Gillette v. United States and
Negre v. Larsen, 401 U.S. 437 (1971), where the Court rejected a free exercise objection to
mandatory participation in war on the view that differentiating among claims of selective consci-
entious objectors would impose too heavy a burden of administrative inconvenience on the govern-
ment. That result misses the point that the purpose of the free exercise clause is to prevent the
government from imposing excessive burdens on religious claimants. One can scarcely imagine a
heavier burden on a sincere pacifist than to be compelled either to kill in the name of the nation-
state or to go to jail for refusing to do so.
219. 475 U.S. 503 (1986).
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designed to further incumbency in office. In particular, it has not demon-
strated any willingness to reconsider the wisdom of the section 501(c)(3) re-
straints. To the contrary, some members of Congress have even affirmed the
efforts of the IRS to expand controls over religious organizations, typically
because of alleged "abuses" of the exempt status that are deemed violations of
the "wall of separation of church and state." Will Rogers used to say that one
of the problems with asking Congress to do something for you is that it might
write a law. As the churches found out with the tax code amendments enacted
in 1934 and 1954, personal pique can become public policy pretty swiftly,
without hearings or debate, and without even a hint that the churches which
will bear the brunt of the regulation had anything to do with the provoking
"problem" that the "legislation" was designed to fix.
Despite all these potentially ill omens for repeal of section 501(c)(3), there
are some indications that the time may be ripe to explore just that possibility.
For one thing, the climate for discussion of this change is better now than it
was five years ago. This is due in no small measure to the efforts of the Wil-
liamsburg Charter Foundation to open up a new dialogue about the role of
religion in public life. The charter document, which has been published in the
Congressional Record,220 was reviewed carefully by politicians on both sides of
the aisle in the Senate and the House. The leadership of both parties commit-
ted themselves to a fresh understanding that "the No Establishment Clause
separates Church from State but not religion from politics or public life," ''
and that religious bodies, no less than secular organizations and individuals,
should enjoy the full benefit of civil liberties in this country.
Long before the recent efforts of the Williamsburg Charter Foundation, the
tendency of Congress to accept its own constitutional responsibility to secure
religious freedom is illustrated in several statutes that grant more by way of
accommodation of religious interests than the judiciary has thought to be re-
quired under the free exercise clause.22 2 For example, the Court did not have
the last word on the issue raised in the Goldman case; Congress did. After the
Court issued its ruling in Goldman, religious organizations, primarily Jewish
agencies, prevailed upon Congress to enact legislation enabling members of the
military to wear unobtrusive religious symbols, including yarmulkes, along
with their military uniform.22 ' I have also referred above to the prospect that,
in response to the Smith case, Congress may enact legislation that would re-
store the compelling state interest standard to adjudication of claims of depri-
vation of religious freedom.
For these reasons, Congress may prove to be more receptive than the courts
to an effective presentation of the claim that the section 501(c)(3) restraints
220. 101st Cong., Ist Sess., 135 CONG. REc. H8707 (1989).
221. The Williamsburg Charter: A Celebration and Reaffirmation of the Religious Liberty
Clauses, supra note 38, at _.
222. For a thoughtful discussion of this theme, see McConnell, Accommodation of Religion,
1985 SuP. CT. REV. I.
223. See 10 U.S.C. § 774 (1988).
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are unconstitutional, or at least to the view that the restraints are unwise and
unnecessary. If this analysis is correct, religious organizations might engage in
new efforts to communicate their needs to the legislative branch now that the
threat of third-party litigation presented in the ARM case has been laid to
rest. At least it may be said that seeking repeal of the offending statutes and.
regulations is less costly and less risky than litigation.
If American religious bodies choose to take this path, they should, of course,
stress, as they did in previous testimony, that for many religious communities
participation in activities relating to politics-including both lobbying and
electioneering-is a core religious function protected under the free exercise
guarantee. In addition, they should remind Congress of the long history of
participation of religious groups in American politics, a much more venerable
tradition than the recent history of restraints on lobbying activities found in
the tax code since 1934, and on electioneering activities since 1954. In the
words of Professor Tribe:
American courts have not thought the separation of church and state to
require that religion be totally oblivious to government or politics; church
and religious groups in the United States have long exerted- powerful politi-
cal pressures on state and national legislatures, on subjects as diverse as
slavery, gambling, drinking, prostitution, marriage, and education. To view
such religious activity as suspect, or to regard its political results as auto-
matically tainted, might be inconsistent with first amendment freedoms of
'eligious and political expression-and might not even succeed in keeping
religious controversy out of public life, given the "political ruptures caused
by the alienation of segments of the religious community.
224
Finally, after the Abortion Rights Mobilization case, religious leaders
might clarify for members of Congress that it is bad enough that the govern-
ment might, through its tax regulations, diminish the courage of religious
leaders to clarify for their congregations and for public policy makers the
moral implications of a wide variety of controversial matters of public policy.
Worse yet is the threat posed by litigation brought by private parties seeking
to use the courts to still the voice of a religious body on a matter of public
controversy. In the first situation, the religious freedom of the churches falls
within the regulatory power of the state. In the second situation, it is prey to
the animosity of hostile outsiders who are unfettered by an oath of office to
uphold the Constitution.
In the words of the Williamsburg Charter, "the No Establishment Clause
separates Church from State but not religion from politics or public life." '25
224. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 866-867 (1st ed. 1978), citing 77 HARV. L.
REV. 1357 (1964). In the second edition to his treatise, supra note 181, at 1282, Tribe modestly
includes only the truncated form of this passage that Justice Brennan cited in McDaniel v. Paty,
435 U.S. 618, 641 n.25 (1978). For my part, I would have preferred it if Tribe had kept the last
sentence in his second edition, but had eliminated the tentative character of the auxiliary verb,
"might," from both clauses.
225. The Williamsburg Charter: A Celebration and Reaffirmation of the Religious Liberty
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Or as Chief Justice Burger wrote in the Walz case, "Adherents of particular
faiths and individual churches frequently take strong positions on public issues
including ... vigorous advocacy of legal or constitutional positions. Of course,
churches as much as secular bodies and private citizens have that right.1226
That right should not be diminished or discouraged through the tax code.
Clauses, supra note 38, at -.
226. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 670 (1970).
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